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Ronald J. Daniels 	 PRIVATE PROVISION 
Michael J. Trebilcock* OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE NEXT PRIVATIZATION FRONTIERt 
I 	 Introduction 
Constrained by severe, ongoing fiscal pressures and sensitive to con- 
cerns over bureaucratic inefficiency, policy-makers in a number of 
countries are re-evaluating both the goals and instruments of the 
modern state. In doing so, some have endorsed the need for govern- 
ment 'reinvention,' a term that is admittedly susceptible of a broad 
range of meanings, but which nonetheless contemplates a significant 
shift away from reliance on governmental provision of goods and 
services in favour of provision by the for-profit and third sectors.' 
Although not uncontroversial, the claim is that, in comparison with 
governmental supply systems, both for-profit and third sector modes of 
delivery offer a superior means for organizing productive activity 
because of the greater incentives that exist within these organizations 
for lower-cost, innovative production. Although the claim has been 
made in a number of different policy contexts, we focus on its salience 
in the context of government's role in supplying traditional physical 
infrastructure projects such as roads and highways, bridges, dams, water 
and sewage systems, and airports. 
Physical infrastructure offers a useful litmus test for evaluating the 
sundry claims that have been made in favour of government reinven- 
tion. First, there is a growing level of concern in both the developed 
and developing world with the adequacy of existing levels of investment 
* 	Both of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
t 	We acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Lesley Arbus, Philip Panet, 
and Randy Cass in the preparation of this article. We also wish to thank Ian Ayres, 
Gillian Hadfield, George Priest, Pablo Spiller, Oliver Williamson, and Ralph A. 
Winter, as well as participants in workshops at the American Law and Economics 
Association annual meeting (May 1995), the Canadian Law and Economics 
Association annual meeting (September 1994), the University of California (at 
Berkeley), and the University of Pennsylvania, for comments on an earlier draft. 
1 See David Osborne and Ted Gaebler Reinventing Governmat (New York: Plume 
1993); The National Performance Review (Gme Repurt on Reinventing Government) 
(New York: Random House, Times Books 1993); Michael Trebilcock The Prospects for 
Reinventing Government (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1994). 
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in infra~tructure.~ In part, concern over infrastructural investment can 
be traced to economic studies that have asserted a strong linkage be- 
tween infrastructure investment and national productivity. Perhaps the 
leading proponent of this view, David Aschauer, has argued that 
declining levels of investment in infrastructure accounted for declining 
productivity growth in the ~7 countries during the 1970s and 1980s." 
Although the magnitude of the purported correlation between infra- 
structure investment and growth has been questioned in subsequent 
research, that research has tended to confirm that such a relationship 
does exist," and, further, that societal welfare gains could be realized 
2 The World Bank has recently undertaken an extensive study of infrastructure invest- 
ment in the developing world: World Bank report Infrastructure forDmeIopnmt (New 
York: Oxford University Press 1994). The report notes that developing countries 
currently invest $200 billion a year in new infrastructure, an amount kqual to 4% of 
their national output and a fifth of their total investment, a level which is expected 
to increase to 7% of total output by the year 2000. While private investment in 
infrastructure now constitutes only 15% of the total investment, given fiscal 
pressures, that level is expected to grow in the near future. 
3 	David Aschauer 'Is Public Expenditure Productive?' (1989) 24 J. of Moneta7y Econ. 
177; 'Does Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?' (1989) 24J of Moneta~y Econ. 
171; and 'Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven' (1989) 
13 Econ. Perspectives. Aschauer's results were based on regression analysis on a 
standard Cobb Douglas aggregate production function which generated predictions 
of the effect of infrastructure investment on productivity. On the basis of Aschauer's 
research, it is possible to attribute fully 100% of the productivity slowdown in the 
United States over the last several decades to declining levels of infrastructure 
investment. Indeed, Aschauer has claimed that returns to core infrastructure 
expenditure may be as much as 20 times that of private capital. (David Aschauer 
'Why Is Infrastructure Important?' in Alicia Munnell (ed.) 'Is the Public Capital 
Stock Too Low?' Chicago Fed. Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, October 
1987, No. 2.) On the basis of this work, Aaron projected that a $500 billion increase 
in the 1988 stock of public capital would translate into a productivity gain of 14.0 to 
14.8%. (Henry J. Aaron, Discussion of 'Why Is Infrastructure Important?' in Alicia 
Munnell, supra, 51-63.) Similarly, Robert Reich has invoked Aschauer's work to 
suggest that a one-time $10 billion increase in new infrastructure investment would 
support a permanent $7 billion increase in US GNP. See Robert Reich 'The Real 
Economy' (February 1991) 267 The Atlantic 35 at 46). 
4 For instance, invoking cost function analysis, Catherine Morrison has found that 
20% of productivity growth in the United States could be attributed to infrastructure 
investment. (Catherine J. Morrison A Microeconomic Appoach to the Measurement of 
Economic Performance: Productivity Growth, Capacity Utilization, and Related Perfnmance 
Indicators (Springer-Verlag Press 1992); 'Macroeconomic Relationships between 
Public Spending on Infrastructure and Private Sector Productivity in the U.S.' in J. 
Mintz (ed.) Infrastructure and Competitiveness (Ontario: Queen's University 1995). 
Specifically, Morrison has concluded that 'the cost-benefits from infrastructure 
investment at the margin appear positive, significant, and often larger than the 
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by reallocating public and private investment away from other expendi- 
tures towards infra~tructure.~ 
A second reason for focusing on physical infrastructure projects 
relates to the challenges in designing workable institutional arrange- 
ments that permit public goals to be vindicated in a setting of en-
hanced private sector involvement. These issues are particularly acute in 
physical infrastructure projects where an amalgam of efficiency and 
distributional goals - public goods, natural monopolies, externalities, 
coordination problems - have traditionally furnished support for public 
intervention of some kind. To the extent that these rationales enjoy 
some continued force, the question is whether and how enhanced 
levels of private sector or third sector involvement can be reconciled 
with a role for the state. 
A final reason for focusing on physical infrastructure relates to the 
distinct properties of these projects and the challenges posed for 
devising optimal institutional arrangements. These properties include: 
(1) the large, up-front investments required by physical infrastructure 
projects (given asset lumpiness, investors often cannot make incre- 
mental investments, and typically these projects have high minimum- 
efficient scales); (2) the longevity of infrastructure assets (implying that 
the life span of the asset will often exceed the term of the project 
contract, which creates contracting problems discussed below); (3) the 
sunk investment in such assets (given the location and use-specific 
nature of these assets, investors will not be able to recover the value of 
their investment through the redeployment of assets to next-best uses); 
(4) the anticipatory character of the investment (the final value of 
physical infrastructure projects is hard to determine ex ante because 
associated costs even when only manufacturing benefits are taken into account' (in 
Mintz, supra). It should be noted that Aschauer's recent work, which is based on an 
expanded framework, yields results that are consistent with Morrison's.) Other 
economists, relying on project-specific cost-benefit analyses, have also demonstrated 
significant gains from targeted infrastructure investment. For instance, David Lewis 
argues that fully audited benefit-cost studies of investments in new runways for 
Minneapolis-St. Paul and Vancouver international airports yield reported rates of 
return in excess of 100%. (David Lewis 'Infrastructure and Economic Growth' in 
Mintz, supra.) He also cites studies respecting other infrastructure projects that 
indicate significant benefits from public infrastructure investment: highway mainten- 
ance projects (30 to 40%), new highway construction in urban areas (10 to 20%), 
and modernization and expansion of air traffic control systems (20 to 25%). For a 
summary of these studies, see World Bank, supra note 2, 15. 
5 See, for instance, Douglas Holtz-Eakin 'Public Sector Capital and the Productivity 
Puzzle' National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 4122, July 1992. 
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the services they provide are dependent upon the value of downstream 
goods and services); and (5) the status of government as a party to 
infrastructure projects with the private sector and the difficulties in 
devising effective contractual commitments against ex post opportunism 
by government. 
. -
In this article, we canvass the scope for enhanced private sector 
involvement in the provision of public infrastructure by focusing on 
several different projects that have been recently initiated or completed 
in Canada: airports (Terminal 3 and the aborted redevelopment of 
Terminals 1 and 2 at Toronto's Pearson International Airport), toll 
roads (Highway 407 north of Toronto), and bridges (the fixed link 
between Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick). The structure of 
these projects is based on an allegedly innovative set of organizational 
arrangements: the so-called public/private sector partnership. The 
stated purpose of these projects is to increase the level of private sector 
participation in designing, building, and operating projects that service 
public goals. 
We develop two central themes in the article. First, while tangible 
efficiency gains can be realized by remitting responsibility for infrastruc- 
ture development to the private sector, we argue that these gains can 
easily be offset by losses that derive from faulty design of both the 
selection process and the contractual arrangements used for implemen- 
tation. Second, and greatly complicating matters, are the contracting 
problems posed by the status of government as a party to the public/ 
private partnership. Because of its inherent powers of legislative fiat, 
governments can abrogate contractual undertakings without having to 
compensate parties for the loss of their expectation profits. The 
existence of this power places understandable limits on the willingness 
of private sector developers to invest risk capital in these projects, 
thereby depriving government of at least some of the benefits from 
private sector involvement. In general, we conclude that insufficient 
attention to the complexities of the institutional challenges raised by 
highly integrated public/private sector infrastructure partnerships has 
led to uncritical enthusiasm for them by many of their proponents. The 
recent World Bank report Inji-astructure for Deuelopmnt strikingly exemp- 
lifies this tendency: while emphasizing the magnitude of present and 
prospective investments in infrastructure by developing countries and 
the potential for a much enlarged role for the private sector in infra- 
structure development and operation, very little attention is paid to the 
design of the institutional processes surrounding public/private sector 
infrastructure partnerships or the complex contracting problems that 
they present. However, the difference between success and failure of 
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these projects in terms of the welfare gains over traditional modes of 
infrastructure development resides in the institutional details that we 
analyse herein. 
I I Three recent Canadian case studies involving public/@vate 
partnerships 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The public/private sector partnerships in the development and opera- 
tion of infrastructure that are proliferating around the world vary 
widely in both scale and nature. According to the World Bank, the 
average size of such projects in low-income countries has been $440 
million and that of projects in the planning stages has been even 
higher, at $640 million. In middle-income countries average project size 
is more than 25% smaller.' However, even in developed economies, 
some projects are of very large scale, the best-known being the private 
financing, construction, and operation of the Channel Tunnel between 
England and France involving a capital investment of about $us11 
billion.' By contrast, a number of public/private infrastructure partner- 
ships relate to relatively small-scale activities, often at the local or 
municipal level, such as water and sewage treatment facilities, often 
entailing capital investments of a few million dollars. The sectors where 
these partnerships have emerged also vary widely and include telecom- 
munications, power generation, power distribution, gas distribution, 
railroads, road infrastructure, ports, airport facilities, and water and 
sewage treatment plants.g The nature of the arrangements involved 
also varies widely. Some involve public ownership with private operation 
through lease contracts, concessions, or management contracts, while 
others involve full private ownership and private operation. Yet others 
involve non-profit operation through local community organization^.'^ 
In this part, we briefly discuss the structure and salient features of 
three recent Canadian case studies involving public/private partner-
ships in the development and operation of public infrastructure that 
are the basis of the organizational analysis we develop in this article: 
6 A detailed description of the case studies is developed in a draft manuscript on file 
with the authors. 
7 World Bank, supra note 2. 
8 See Robert Tiong 'Comparative Study of BOT Projects' (1990) 6J. of Managemat in 
Engineering 107, 108. 
9 World Bank, supra note 2, 64. 
10 Ibid. 8 and 9. 
Highway 407; The Prince Edward Island Fixed Link; and the redevelop- 
ment of Pearson International Airport in Toronto. 
B. HIGHWAY 407 
Highway 407 is a 69 km toll highway that is designed to alleviate traffic 
congestion in the northern region of the Greater Toronto Area at a 
cost of $929.8 million." Although the provincial ministry of transport 
was initially committed to developing the project as a non-toll highway 
through the traditional procurement model, government budget con- 
straints would have dictated the project's completion over a twenty-year 
period. By structuring the project as a public/private partnership, the 
government was able to expedite the project's development to four-and- 
a-half years." Further, by vesting ownership of the highway for a term 
in the private sector, it can be presumed that government's direct re- 
sponsibility for the imposition of the tolling charge (a revenue genera- 
tion device used infrequently in Canada on public highways) would be 
attenuated. 
Responsibility for the selection of a project developer was vested in a 
Crown corporation, the Ontario Transportation Capital Corporation 
(oTcc) . '"~~ OTCC used a three-stage selection process, involving an 
initial request for expressions of interest and qualifications, a value 
engineering exercise,14 and a closed-bid request for proposals. Three 
consortia participated in the first round of the selection process, but 
one consortium was disqualified early on, and only two bidders sub- 
11 	 Employment benefits are estimated at 3,000 jobs in the first year and 20,000jobs 
over the life of the construction project. jobsontario: Capital, news release, 8 April 
and 1 1  May 1994. 
12 	Under the public/private partnership model, the project would take only four-and-a- 
half years rather than the twenty years necessary under the traditional model. 
Conversation with L. Brian Swartz, legal counsel, MTO, 1 June 1994. 
13 	The OTCC was established in 1993 for the purpose of financing and implementing 
major public transit and highway construction projects, encouraging private sector 
invesunent and participation, and focusing on user-pay financing methods. jobson- 
tario news release, 10 February 1993. The actual nature of the relationship between 
the OTCC and the provincial government is unclear, and the Crown corporation 
seems to be an attempt by the Ontario government to shift infrastructure financing 
off-budget, even though OTCC debt remains a liability of the provincial govern- 
ment. Although the OTCC is structured as a mechanism which dedicates toll 
revenues to financing highway construction, it also seems to be able to finance 
construction at least in part by borrowing against the general provincial credit 
through government guarantees. 
14 See discussion in note 48. infra. 
mitted final bids. While it was initially anticipated that the project 
would be privately financed, concerns by the remaining bidders with 
the risks of low traffic volumes led to demands for government financial 
guarantees. Ultimately, however, the government concluded that the 
benefits of private sector financing did not outweigh the costs of such 
guarantees, and the project was financed entirely through an o ~ c c  
public debt issue. At the end of the selection process, the OTCC selected 
Canadian Highways International Corporation to design and build the 
project. As of June 1996, the operation and maintenance contracts had 
not yet been executed. 
C. THE PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND FIXED LINK 
The Prince Edward Island Fixed Link is a federally sponsored project to 
build a 13.5 km bridge across the Northumberland Strait, which would 
constitute the first permanent crossing between PEI and the mainland. 
The fixed link would seme as a substitute for the existing ferry service 
between the mainland and PEI, which, in accordance with a constitu- 
tional obligation, was required to be subsidized by the federal govern- 
ment. The principal avowed benefit of the project was a significant 
reduction in the time necessary to travel to and from the province, 
resulting in enhanced local business competitiveness and increased 
Island to~r i sm. '~  As well, by contracting out the obligation to link the 
mainland and PEI, the federal government sought to reduce the 
financial level of its constitutional obligation. 
The project was initiated in 1985, when the federal government 
received several unsolicited private sector proposals for the develop 
ment of a fixed link between PEI and the mainland. The project was 
subject to extensive public review for social (particularly environmental) 
benefits before and after the selection process was commenced.I6 
15 The economic value of the reduced travel time is estimated to be $398.4 million 
(1993$) (A Bmjit-Cost Analysis of the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project, prepared 
by Gardner Pinfold Consulting Economists Limited, September 1993 at p. 4). The 
fixed link is also expected to have additional indirect benefits on economic activity 
in PEI and the Atlantic provinces, since construction of the bridge creates a large, 
front-end-loaded job creation stimulus in the Atlantic economy, which is currently 
suffering from a severe decline in the Maritime fishery - perhaps as many as 1,500 
direct-hire jobs annually over the life of the project. (William G. Reinhardt 'PEI 
Bridge Project Essentials' (November 1993) 68 PWinann'ng 23.) 
16 The initial cost-benefit study conducted by PWC (Economic Feasibility Assessment 
for the Northumberland Strait Crossing, Draft Final Report, July 1987, Fiander-Good 
Associates Ltd.), which found a net benefit of close to $500 million (19875). has 
been criticized on methodological grounds (Peter Townley 'The Weakest Link' 
Indeed, so intense was public concern with the social impact of the 
project that nearly six-and-a-half years transpired between the publica- 
tion of the initial request for expressions of interest and the execution 
of the contract between Strait Crossing Inc. (sc1)17 and the federal 
government.I8 
As with Highway 407, the government used a multi-stage selection 
process, in this case involving an initial request for expressions of 
interest and qualifications, a request for proposals, and a request for 
more complete proposals (including a financial plan). Initially, twelve 
different consortia expressed interest in the project. However, by the 
final stage of the selection process, only three bidders remained. The 
winning bidder, SCI, was selected on the basis that, inter alia, it 
required the lowest level of federal financial assistance to develop the 
project: $40.6 million annually for a term of 35 years.'Y The subsidy 
conferred by the federal government on the project operators graphi- 
cally underscores the persistence of government risk sharing in these 
pr~jects.'~Having selected scr, sixteen months of negotiations were 
required before the government and the consortium were able to 
(July/August 1992) 13(6) Policy Options 15; and A Review of the Bmfit-Cost Analysis of 
the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project, prepared by Gardner Pinfold Consulting 
Economists Limited, September 1992). However, a subsequent cost-benefit study 
conducted by one of the critics found a net benefit of $263.6 million (19935) 
(Gardner Pinfold, supra note 15; note that this 1993 study was commissioned by 
Public Works Canada). The main difficulties in the cost-benefit studies were the 
valuation of travel savings, the treatment of corporate taxes, and the determining of 
the social opportunity cost of labour. 
17 SCI is a joint venture owned by four firms: Strait Crossing Inc. of Calgary (15%); 
Northern Construction Co. (35%); GTMI (Canada) Inc. of Montreal (30%); and 
Ballast Nedam (20%). Consultation with Strait Crossing office, Charlottetown, 26 
August 1994. 
18 Such searching social review is a necessary complement to whatever private sector 
certification occurs through the financing process, as the latter is predicated on 
private, not social, costs and benefits. 
19 The federal government's obligation to supply $41.9 million a year in indexed 
funding to the project developers was then used to support a debt issue of $661 
million by the developers in exchange for rights to the subsidy. After the 35-year 
period, the government's subsidy would end, and the project developers would be 
required to recover ongoing maintenance costs entirely from toll revenues. 
20 	 In addition, the federal government assumed a number of different exogenous risks 
related to the project, in some cases agreeing to compensate SCI for costs of delay 
related to war, earthquakes, nuclear events, government regulation specifically 
affecting the project, and environmental injunctions. 
conclude a ~ontract.~'To safeguard XI'S franchise, the contract 
between the federal government and the developer limited the govern- 
ment's ability to compete with the project by providing ferry service or 
by constructing an additional bridge or tunnel within 25 km of the 
fixed link or by any means that would significantly reduce traffic 
volumes. However, in the light of the monopoly power conferred on 
the operator by this restriction, the contract imposed limits on permis- 
sible increases in bridge tolls by the operator to 75% of CPI. 
D. THE REDEVELOPMENT OF PEARSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
The Pearson International Airport project was a staged public/private 
project designed to redevelop Toronto's congested international airport 
by securing private sector involvement in the design, construction, and 
operation of two new terminal facilities. The first, Terminal 3 (T3), 
involved the construction of a new terminal building, parking garage, 
and adjacent hotel and office complex, while the second, the redevel- 
opment of Terminals 1and 2 (TlT2), involved the replacement of the 
airport's two existing (and somewhat dilapidated) terminals with a 
single new terminal which would have had 55 gates in total by the year 
2000." Several reasons were advanced for enlisting private sector 
involvement in the project, including higher levels of revenue likely to 
be generated for the federal government by the project (as opposed to 
a scenario of continued federal government ownership and operation), 
the need to ensure the timely introduction of new capacity, and the 
superior organizational efficiency of the private sector.23 The T3 pro- 
ject was announced in 1986 and was based upon a two-stage selection 
process: an initial request for expressions of interest and qualifications, 
and then a second-stage request for proposals. As in other projects, the 
criteria used to determine success in the first-round tournament for 
design ideas were fairly broadly defined: Transport Canada merely 
identified that the objectives of the project were to: provide a 'world- 
class' terminal in the shortest period of time; provide a financial return 
21 	 The primary factors in this delay were the two environmental challenges pursued in 
the Federal Court against the minister of public works. 
22 	According to a 1987 Transport Canada study, Pearson International Airport has a $4 
billion direct economic impact on the economy of Ontario and is directly and in- 
directly responsible for over 56,000jobs. Referred to in the Nixon Report, infra. 
23 	According to Transport Canada, the purposes of the Terminal 3 development were 
to (1) provide a world-class air terminal facility; (2) reduce government investment 
in airport facilities; (3) increase private sector participation; and (4) provide a 
financial return to the federal government. See LBPIA-General Distribution, p. 6. 
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to the Crown; and maintain acceptable levels of safety and security to 
air travellers in Canada. Requests by the bidders for information with 
respect to the actual weighting of each of these factors by the project 
evaluation team were refused. Eight bids were submitted in the design 
tournament, and, of those, five consortia were qualified to proceed to 
the second stage. Of these, only four consortia submitted final propo- 
sals, and, at the end of June 1987, the federal government awarded the 
project to Airport Development Corporation (ADC). Within five months, 
the government was able to execute a contract with ADC for the project 
based on a 40-year lease (with a 20-year period of renewal) with required 
annual lease payments that would vary directly with gross revenues and 
with the time since project completion. Although the project was 
expected to cost $350 million, an expansion in capacity to accommo- 
date an expected increase in traffic load of the terminal's principal 
tenant, Canadian Airlines, increased costs to $550 million. The project 
was completed within 32 months of commencement. 
Whereas the rapid completion of the T3 project was viewed as a 
model for public/private partnerships, the TIT2 redevelopment project 
was much less so. Almost from the outset, the project was embroiled in 
controversy. The first reason for controversy was based on the federal 
government's decision, apparently motivated by revenue goals, to 
depart from its stated policy preference for vesting responsibility for the 
development of federal airports in local airport authorities - not-for-
profit organizations which would be governed by, and accountable to, 
local interest groups.24 The second principal reason for controversy 
was the decision to proceed with the project by way of a single-stage 
selection process rather than the multi-stage selection process that had 
been used in other projects. Concerns over the process were com-
pounded by the decision to allow only 90 days (later extended to 125 
days) for the submission of formal proposals. However, given the long 
(one-and-a-half-year) period of delay between the time when the 
government announced its intention to seek private sector participation 
in the T1T2 project and the call for proposals, the accelerated time 
24 	The decision to proceed with a private developer was motivated by the desire to 
ensure the rapid development of the project (specifically with a view to increasing 
local construction employment) and by infighting among local politicians over the 
composition of the local airport authority designated for the Greater Toronto Area. 
It was also alleged by some that patronage considerations affected the decision (see, 
for instance, Nixon Report at 9). The federal government's preference for the local 
airport authority concept was set out in Guiding Principles (Ottawa: Ministry of 
Transport 1987) and elaborated upon in Supplementaq Principles for the Creation and 
Operation of Local AilgM Authurities (Ottawa: Ministry of Transport 1989). 
period may not have visited serious hardship on interested bidders. In 
any event, three bids for the project were ultimately submitted, of 
which two were deemed to be within the stipulated terms of reference. 
Of these two, the government awarded the contract to Paxport Inc. 
However, soon after the contract was awarded, Paxport was required to 
merge with the losing bidder, Air Terminal Development Group,'" 
because the former lacked the financial resources to develop the 
project on its own.26 
In August 1993 (eight months after the contract was awarded), a 
general agreement for the project was concluded between the merged 
consortium, Pearson Development Corporation (PDC),  and the federal 
government. As in the case of Terminal 3, the arrangement was struc- 
tured as a long-term lease (57 years) involving sliding-scale lease pay- 
ments. Similar to the PEI Fixed Link, the contract with the developer 
limited the government's ability to undertake actions which would 
directly debase the operator's franchise, by, for instance, permitting an 
airport to be built within 25 kilometres of the airport if it would reduce 
passenger volume by more than 1.5million passengers a year.'7 How- 
ever, the TIT2 contract did stipulate limits on the prices that retail 
concessionaires and parking lot operators could charge customers2s 
and provided constraints on the strategic use by occupant airlines of 
the airport gates to forestall entry by competitors.29 Further, as in 
other projects we surveyed, in both the T3 and TIT2 airport develop 
ments, the federal government agreed to a scaled rental formula that 
resulted in a de facto sharing of the risks of low gross revenues with the 
developer/operat~r.~These were supplemented in the case of T3 by 
a $70million loan guarantee contingent on low passenger volume^.^' 
25 ATDC was substantially the same consortium that had developed and was operating 
Terminal 3. 
26 Apparently, the federal government failed to consider financing capability when 
reviewing prospective developers for the project. 
27 However, once a stipulated threshold level of passenger volume was exceeded, the 
constraint would no longer apply. 
28 Prices charged could not exceed 115%of the prices charged for comparable goods 
and services in downtown Toronto. 
29 Through 'use them or lose them' requirements. 
30 It also consented to the airport developer utilizing a cost-based rental formula in 
respect of the rental obligations of the retail concessionaires and airlines, which, 
given the monopoly properties of the airport, can best be understood as an 
enforced sharing of developer/operator risks with these parties. 
31 While such a guarantee was not provided for in the T1T2 project, the government 
did make an allowance for a maximum $33 million deferral of rental payments 
incurred by the developer in the first three years of the project. 
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Given the intense concern expressed by the press and others during 
the 1993 fall federal election campaign with the terminal development, 
Jean Chrktien's newly elected Liberal government requested a review 
and report of the transaction from Robert Nixon, a prominent Liberal 
party member and former provincial cabinet minister. His report, 
completed in a mere 30 days, found that the contract with the consor- 
tium was severely flawed and should be cancelled, subject only to 
minimal levels of compensation (for expenditures made to the date of 
cancellation) being provided to consortium members." On 3 Decem-
ber 1993 the government cancelled the contract. However, issues of 
compensation for PDC could not be resolved through negotiation, and 
in April 1994 the government introduced legislation which would 
permit it to impose a settlement of approximately $30 million on the 
developers, but without the attendant procedural safeguards that 
normally accompany the public power of confiscati~n.~~ The legisla- 
tion has not yet been adopted by Parliament because of the determined 
32 Nixon concluded that the  project ' fe l l  far short of  maximizing the  public interest' 
(at  9 ) .  T h e  recommendation that t h e  deal b e  abrogated was based o n  perceived 
infirmities i n  bo th  t he  selection process and t he  contracts designed t o  implement 
t h e  transaction. In terms o f  the  former,  Nixon  focused o n  t he  fact that the  
privatization of the  terminals contradicted stated government policy i n  favour o f  
local airport authorities; o n  t he  single-stage, abbreviated selection process that led t o  
an  enormous advantage t o  ATDC (which had gained previous experience through 
its successful participation i n  t h e  Terminal  3 contract); and o n  the  lack of  a 
financial prequalification requirement. Nixon  further alleged that the  selection 
process was sullied by patronage - three individuals i n  t h e  consortium were closely 
identified with t h e  Progressive Conservative party. T h e  report also alleged a number  
ofsubstantive shortcomings i n  t h e  contracts.-Among the  most  serious was the  length 
of  the  lease term,  which Nixon characterized as being 'difficult t o  fathom' given 
that 'with an  asset as moved by  technological change as an  airport, the  length of this 
obligation does no t  serve the  public interest' (a t  11) .  In Nixon's view, t h e  rental 
formula was flawed because future government revenues f rom t he  project would be  
. -
highly dependent  o n  aggressive pricing conducted without appropriate govern- 
mental control and at t h e  risk o f  making t he  airport uncompetitive with other 
airports i n  Canada and t he  United States (a t  11 ) .  It is, o f  course, no t  sel fevident  
why t he  private developer would adopt operational policies that would make  t he  
project uncompetitive. Finally, Nixon expressed concern with the  broadly phrased 
performance obligations that bound PDC, noting that it would b e  difficult for the  
Government o f  Canada t o  determine when  such obligations are breached. Because 
the  government's remedies for breach are so Draconian (cancellation or seizure and 
operation),  Nixon speculated that the  government would be  unlikely t o  exercise 
such powers (at  12) .  
33  Bill G22 :  An Act respecting certain agreements concerning the  redevelopment and 
operation of Terminals 1 and 2 at Lester B. Pearson International Airport (First 
Session, Thirty-Fifth Parliament, 42-3 Elizabeth 11, 1994). 
resistance of the Progressive Conservative-controlled Senate to the
-
measure, fuelled by growing public apprehension regarding the bill and 
by a judicial determination that the government had breached its 
contractual obligation^.'^ The matter was remitted to a special Senate 
committee on the Pearson Airport agreements for a public inquiry, 
which divided along partisan lines in its 1995 report. 
E. SUMMARY: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Following the standard pattern for large-scale infrastructure projects, 
each of the projects we examined contained several common character- 
istics. First, each of the projects entailed large, up-front, sunk invest- 
ments by bidders that were not compensated for by direct ex ante 
government subsidies (ranging from approximately $6 million incurred 
by the bidders who submitted proposals for the Highway 407 project to 
$30 million incurred by SCI in developing its bridge proposap5). 
Second, each of the projects implicated a range of public policy 
concerns which could not be sidestepped by the decision to develop 
the project through a public/private partnership. As illustrated by the 
PEI Fixed Link, concern over the effectiveness and transparency of 
levers that the state would be able to wield during and after the 
construction of the project led to heightened public apprehension 
around the project's merits and resulted in considerable delay. Indeed, 
review of the contracts concluded between sponsoring governments (or 
their agents) and the project developers disclosed considerable atten- 
tion to these public policy concerns. In some cases, specific contractual 
limitations were placed on the operator's ability to charge monopoly 
prices for access to the goods and services under consideration. In the 
T3 airport project the contract went even further, explicitly incorporat- 
ing by reference federal, provincial, and municipal laws, and making 
non-compliance with these laws an event of default under the contract. 
Of course, given developer concerns over sunk, up-front investments in 
34 This finding was in the context of a claim made by the consortium against the 
federal government for unspecified damages but apparently alleging losses, 
including forgone profits, in excess of $200 million: TIT2 Limited Paflnership v. 
Canada [I9951 OJ No. 137, Court File No. 94-CQ53762 (Ontario Court of Justice 
General Division, per Borins J) (plaintiffs have provided evidence which satisfies me 
that the defendant committed a breach of the airport contracts on 3 December 
1993, at paragraph 4).  See also 'Developers Sue Over Loss of Airport Deal' Globe and 
Mail, 17 September 1994. 
35 Apparently the bidding costs were fifteen times higher than originally projected by 
SCI. William G. Reinhardt 'The High Cost of Building Bridges' (November 1993) 68 
PWinann'ng 18, 26. 
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specific assets, the desire to incorporate sensitivity to broadly defined 
public policy concerns often was in direct tension with the need to 
provide credible assurances to the developer/operator (as an induce- 
ment to investment) that the franchise value of the undertaking would 
not be debased ex post by direct governmental action. Third, with the 
exception of the T3 airport project, the process used to award the 
infrastructure franchise involved multiple stages, typically an initial 
tournament for design ideas followed by a final competition for the 
construction and operation contract for those bidders successful in the 
first stage.36 One notable feature of the selection process used in each 
of these cases was the small number of bidders who actually progressed 
to the final stage of the t~urnament.~'  A fourth common characteristic 
of these projects was the lengthy period of time (ranging from several 
months in the case of T3 to well over a year in the case of the PEI Fixed 
Link) between the time of the formal award of the franchise and the 
actual consummation of the written contract necessary to implement 
the project, which probably attenuated the impact of the competitive 
bidding process on the winning bidder's post-selection performance 
incentives. Fifth, despite the characterization of these projects as being 
based on the efficiency benefits associated with private sector finance 
and risk bearing, virtually all of these projects revealed some significant 
role for the government in this area, ranging from government-backed 
public financing of the entire project, in the case of Highway 407; to 
provision of a long-term governmental subsidy that was used to fund 
the lion's share of the project costs, in the case of the PEI Fixed Link; 
to revenue-based ground lease payments that rendered government a 
quasi-residual claimant, in the case of the airport terminals. Sixth, as is 
true of long-term contractual relationships generally, the contracts 
executed between sponsoring governments and franchise operators 
disclosed considerable reliance on elaborately designed adjustment 
formulas (in respect of pricing and maintenance obligations) and 
governance structures to deal with problems of contractual incomplete- 
36 Information respecting the structure of these projects was derived principally from 
an extensive set of interviews conducted over the summer of 1994 with public and 
private sector experts involved in the projects and from inspection of the various 
contracts used to implement the projects. 
37 In Highway 407, three bidders expressed initial interest, but only two progressed to 
the final stage of the bidding process; in the PEI F i e d  Link, twelve bidders 
expressed initial interest, but only five progressed to the final stage; in the T3 
airport project, eight bidders started out, but only four progressed to the final stage; 
while in the T1T2 project, only three bidders submitted proposals. 
ness." Significantly, when governance mechanisms were utilized, the 
mechanisms were based on standard arbitration models used in the 
private sector. To the extent that it has been argued by Goldberg and 
others that the adjustment mechanisms used by public utility commis- 
sions to administer regulatory contracts are functionally equivalent to 
the contractual provisions embedded in long-term public franchise con- 
tracts, this claim is thus only partially correct in the context of the 
contracts we e~amined.~'  In contrast to the public utility model, public 
franchise contracts reveal only limited opportunity for meaningful levels 
of transparency or public participation, thereby raising fundamental 
accountability concerns. 
111 Analysis of the organizational structure of public/pi.vate 
infimtructure partnerships 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to appreciate the distinctive features of many of the public/ 
private partnerships that have emerged in the infrastructure setting, 
particularly with respect to larger projects, it is important not to draw 
too sharp a dichotomy between the respective roles of the public and 
private sectors. With many publicly owned and operated infrastructure 
facilities, such as airport terminals, many of the functions have tradi- 
tionally been contracted out, for example, catering, security services, 
airplane refuelling, baggage handling, retail concessions, and janitorial 
services. Moreover, even with respect to the initial construction of these 
facilities, governments rarely, if ever, build these facilities themselves 
through public sector employees, but rather tender out the construc- 
tion through a competitive bidding process against a detailed set of 
tender specifications that the government has developed either intern- 
ally or through consulting arrangements with external design specialists, 
38 For instance, concerns over asset degradation through chiselling on required 
maintenance - one of the principal contractual difficulties involving assets having an 
expected life that exceeds the term of the franchise contract - were dealt with 
through a number of different mechanisms, including: general exhortatory duties 
on the developer/operator to maintain assets in an appropriate condition, stipulated 
expenditures on asset maintenance (expressed as a percentage of annual gross 
revenues), annual contributions to an asset reserve fund, periodic inspections by 
third-party monitors, and provision for resolution of disputes over the breadth of 
this obligation through binding arbitration. 
39 Victor Goldberg 'Regulation and Administered Contracts' (1976) BeUJ. ofEcon. 426. 
See also George Priest 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of 
Regulation" Debate' (1993) 36 J.L.E 289. 
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with the winning bidder in turn subcontracting out various aspects of 
the construction to specialized third parties, often through a competi- 
tive bidding process of its own. 
The most distinctive feature of many of the larger public/private 
sector infrastructure partnerships that are now emerging is the integra- 
tion within a single private sector firm or consortium of all (or most of) 
the functions of financing, designing, building, operating, and main- 
taining the facility in question (subject again to further subcontracting 
out). The bundling of these functions reflects a form of vertical integra- 
tion on the part of the private sector provider of these services. Because 
the functions involved are often highly specialized and entail deploy- 
ment of quite different bodies of complementary expertise and re-
sources, private sector providers are, however, typically not vertically 
integrated firms in a conventional sense but consortia ('virtual corpora- 
tions') that are formed to develop and operate a particular infrastruc- 
ture facility. This arrangement reflects the often relatively sui generis 
requirements of that facility, usually involving as participants engineer- 
ing and project management firms, construction firms, financial under- 
writers, and specialized operating firms. While the consortia typically 
incorporate their joint venture as a corporation for the project in 
question, they have a higher degree of malleability or transitoriness 
relative to the conventional firm. The partners often maintain substan- 
tially independent activities, although there are clear reputation and 
learning curve advantages for consortia in preserving some stability of 
membership where there are opportunities for bidding on similar 
infrastructure projects in what is rapidly becoming a global market for 
these services, and in these cases consortia may evolve permanent 
corporate structure^.^^ 
In this section of the article, we explore the potential efficiency gains 
to be made, at least in principle, from extensive integration, or bundl- 
ing of financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance 
functions in a single provider. At the same time we examine a range of 
institutional problems relating to the design of the bidding process, the 
contract negotiation process, and contract monitoring and enforcement 
processes which these new arrangements give rise to and which may 
substantially attenuate potential efficiency gains from this particular 
form of privatization of public sector activities. The problems of 
40 In the T3 airport project, the principal construction firm, Huang and Danczkay, 
sold its interests once the terminal was completed, illustrating the fluid nature of 
these relationships. 
creating and preserving a genuinely competitive bidding and rebidding 
process, the long-term nature of the contracts entailed and hence the 
difficulties of writing complete contingent claims contracts, the large- 
scale sunk costs typically involved, and the financial sensitivity of these 
projects to changes in the governmental policy environment all raise 
special challenges. We also briefly consider distributional and political 
considerations that may influence a government's decision to privatize 
infrastructure services and the form that the privatization arrangements 
may take. We then analyse the particular problems of credible commit- 
ments raised by the central fact that the government is a party to these 
contractual arrangements. 
B. POTENTIAL EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM VERTICALLY INTEGRATED PRIVATE 
SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION 
1. The traditional procurement model 
In assessing the potential efficiency gains that may be realized from 
vertically integrated private sector providers (consortia) of infrastruc- 
ture services, it is important to be clear as to the comparative reference 
point against which these arrangements are being evaluated. For major 
road, bridge, or airport facilities of the kind on which this article 
focuses, governments traditionally have themselves identified the need 
for the project, often reflecting pressures for or against particular 
projects by politically salient constituencies, and sometimes tested more 
objectively through benefit-cost analysis. Whether the project proceeds 
or not has been, to an important extent, contingent on the relevant 
level of government's fiscal capacity at the time (in many countries in 
recent years increasingly constrained by severe budget deficits) and on 
the revenuegenerating capacity of the project, which in turn in part 
depends on where it is situated on the public-goods/privategoods 
continuum in terms of meeting the criteria of rivalry and excludability 
that distinguish private goods from public goods, and in part on 
distributional and political considerations that may dictate that the 
services in question should be provided free or at subsidized rates to 
some or all user classes, even where efficient user charges for the 
-
services in question could be devised. Assuming that a decision is made 
to proceed with the project, typically government will draw up a set of 
comprehensive technical specifications for the initial construction of 
the facility, in part relying on already developed technical standards or 
manual specifications for the class of facility in question, or, to the 
extent the facility presents novel features, through project-specific 
specifications developed by internal technical personnel or outside 
392 UNIVERSITY OF  TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 
specialized consultants such as architectural or engineering firms, or 
some combination thereof. Once these detailed specifications have 
been fully developed, government departments or agencies would then 
typically advertise for tenders for the construction of the facility in a 
competitive bidding process. In order to qualify as bidders, firms may 
be required to demonstrate relevant credentials such as financial and 
technical capacity, and past experience and performance records on 
similar projects. The contract with the winning bidder will specify 
completion date, security and penalties for non-completion or other 
defaults in performance, and provide for a schedule of payments to the 
construction firm reflecting satisfactory completion of sequential stages 
of the project as determined either by staff of the government depart- 
ment or agency concerned or by some agreed third-party certification 
agent. Broadly speaking, contracts could be cost-plus, fixed-price, or 
incentive ~ontracts.~' With respect to cost-plus contracts, these provide 
few incentives for the private sector contractor to minimize construc- 
tion costs and correspondingly entail greater risk for the public sector, 
which will attempt to minimize this risk by intensive but costly monitor- 
ing of the contractor's costs. Under a fixed-price contract, the contrac- 
tor's costs will be of no direct concern to the government, so that less 
intensive monitoring will be required, although monitoring will still be 
relevant to non-price dimensions of performance. If construction costs 
are likely to be affected by technological uncertainties, climatic factors, 
variable input prices, or labour shortages or disputes, these risks, which 
the contractor will bear, will presumably be reflected in a risk premium 
embodied in the fixed price negotiated in the contract. Under incen- 
tive contracts, these risks may be shared in various ways. Any such risk 
sharing will involve risk-incentive trade-offs. Incentives on the contrac- 
tor to minimize costs may be reduced, to the extent that he can control 
these factors, although the risk premium charged the government for 
risks over which he has little or no control is likely to be smaller. With 
respect to government-determined risks or entirely exogenous risks, the 
government may be the more efficient risk bearer, given its greater 
capacity to spread the risk. After satisfactory completion of the project, 
the government may choose to operate the facility entirely itself 
through government employees; or, depending on the nature of the 
facility, it may contract out, for limited periods of time, under a com- 
petitive bidding process, the performance of various functions. 
41 	 See R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan Incentives in Government Contracting 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1988). 
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2. The vertically integrated private sector model 
a)  Project identification. In comparison with this traditional model of the 
infrastructure development and operation process, the fully vertically 
integrated private provision model that is the focus of this article differs 
in important respects. First, the government may choose to invite 
private sector firms to identify potential infrastructure projects. For 
example, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 
recently issued an open-ended public invitation for private sector firms 
to propose toll-road projects in California, which the government 
agency then e~aluated.~' Complete government detachment from the 
question of which projects should proceed is often impossible because 
of right-of-way and eminent domain issues, network externalities, other 
external impacts, and monopoly pricing concerns. The private sector, 
in identifying potential infrastructure projects, will of course be driven 
by a different set of considerations from the public sector in engaging 
in the same exercise. As noted above, the public sector is likely to 
respond to a mix of political pressures and may in addition undertake 
a benefit-cost analysis that weighs all relevant social costs and benefits 
associated with the project. Private sector proposals will be influenced 
only by the expected private rate of return on the project, which will 
disregard political pressures one way or the other, and are likely to also 
disregard external costs and benefits of the project that would be 
captured in a comprehensive social benefit-cost analysis. However, with 
a totally open-ended public sector invitation to the private sector to 
propose new infrastructure projects, the evaluation process that the 
public sector will subsequently have to undertake of these proposals will 
presumably implicate both political considerations and social costs and 
benefits, so that proposers are likely to attempt to anticipate, and to 
some extent accommodate, these considerations in their proposals, 
consistently with realizing an adequate private rate of return on the 
project. Unless most of the evaluation criteria to be employed by the 
government are rendered at least partly explicit and transparent, or 
other indications are provided in the invitation that to some extent 
define the range of projects in which the government may be inte- 
42 	See Jose Gomez-Ibanez and John Meyer Going Aiuate: The International Experience with 
Transpmt Priuatization (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1993);Ron Hirshhorn 
'The Ownership and Organization of Transportation Infrastructure: Roads and 
Airports' Background Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on National 
Passenger Transportation: Directions (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada 1992) 18. 
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rested, proposers are unlikely to invest significant resources, at least in 
the absence of subsidies, in developing proposals that may prove to be 
of no interest to the government. In any event, these proposals are 
likely to be framed at a largely conceptual level, leaving detailed design 
for the post-project identification stage. 
Under the fully vertically integrated private provider model, once a 
project has been identified, at least at the conceptual level, either by 
the government itself or by the government in response to private 
sector proposals, in theory the government would call for integrated 
bids on the design, construction, operation, and maintenance aspects of 
the project. Each of these functions needs to be analysed both separate- 
ly and in relation to the other functions in the bundle. 
b) Design. With respect to the design function, the argument by 
proponents of the privatization of infrastructure provision is that unlike 
the traditional method of contracting out engaged in by government in 
the infrastructure context, where comprehensive specifications of 
project characteristics are provided to private sector parties, the govern- 
ment stands to realize substantial efficiency gains from contracting out 
the design function and, in effect, stimulating competition for ideas. 
Implicit in this view is the notion that governments should shift their 
focus from specifying inputs to specifying some desired outcome, 
leaving private sector providers with the opportunity of formulating 
means of realizing that outcome in the most cost-efficient way possible. 
Under the traditional contracting-out regime, government agencies 
would typically rely on standardized specifications or bureaucrats would 
develop design specifications for sui generis projects, but with few 
incentives to maximize service innovations or minimize costs, and 
disabled by major information asymmetries as to what may or may not 
be technologically feasible - expertise which is likely to be better known 
to private sector firms specializing in the technologies in question.4J 
43 	In this respect, the multi-stage structure of the public/private partnership bears 
striking similarity to the model used by the US federal government for defence 
procurement. Because of long lag times between the development and production 
of defence weapons, defence production is characterized by severe demand and cost 
uncertainties and, as a consequence of required up-front investments in asset-
specific research and production, is beset by endemic hold-up problems. One of the 
principal models used to resolve these difficulties is a multi-stage selection process 
that involves competition for a procurement contract on the basis of research ideas 
tendered in the first stage of the selection process. Interestingly, and in contrast to 
the structure typically used in the public/private partnership infrastructure studies 
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On the approach advocated by proponents of the vertically inte- 
grated model of infrastructure provision, it is critical that the govern- 
ment be able to specify some desired outcome or output against which 
competing designs can be evaluated. This may be more feasible in some 
infrastructure projects than others. For example, in designing a bridge 
or a toll road, the government could stipulate that the bridge or road 
must be capable of moving a given volume of traffic over given units of 
time. In other projects, such as designing airport facilities, the policy 
objective is much less easy to specify, involving the aggregation and 
reconciliation of many preferences;44 in these cases private sector 
providers will face difficulties in determining what criteria their poten- 
tial designs will be evaluated against, and government and public sector 
agents will have diff~culty evaluating competing and perhaps sharply 
different design proposals without well-specified outcome measures, at 
least if the risk of appearing arbitrary, subjective, or politically moti- 
vated (or even corrupt) is to be a~oided.~' Obviously, the less clearly 
we examined, the federal government will subsidize the development of designs in 
the first stage of the selection process. However, the subsidy covers only a portion of 
the costs actually incurred by bidders in the qualifying rounds of the project and so, 
as in the case of the infrastructure projects we examined, the bidders' decision to 
invest in research and development is based on a private cost-benefit analysis that 
compares the upfront costs incurred in design development with the probability of 
winning the project multiplied by its economic value. After the design proposals are 
submitted, the government will select two (or more) bidders (of the five or so 
initially qualified to enter the competition) to proceed to the second stage of the 
competition where a more detailed prototype of the weapon is developed for 
competition in the third and final stage of the selection process, wherein the 
winning bidder will then secure from government a cost-reimbursement-based 
procurement contract to supply the weapons. An excellent overview of the defence 
procurement process is provided by William P. Rogerson 'Economic Incentives and 
the Defense Procurement Process' (1994) 8J. of Econ. Perspectives 65. 
44 	See David Sappington and Joseph Stiglitz 'Privatization, Information and Incentives' 
(1987) 6 J. of Policy Analysis & Management 567, 575. 
45 Curtis Taylor ('Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments' 
(draft dated October 1993) forthcoming in the AER) argues that the golden carrot 
tournament solves for both the input monitoring and output specification problems 
associated with research: 'Competition among researchers trying to win the contest 
causes expending effort to be incentive compatible. Moreover, the only role of the 
courts is to ensure that the specified "prize" ... is awarded to one of the contestants at 
the conclusion of the contest. It is not men necessary that a court be a b b  to veri3 the rank 
order o f t k 5 n a l  entries since t k  sponsor typically has littb incentive other than to exchange the 
pnze for the innovation it values most.' Nevertheless, given endemic accountability 
problems surrounding public officials, the application of this conclusion to competi- 
tions involving adjudication by public officials is somewhat problematic. 
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specified the project selection criteria, the greater the latitude that 
decision-makers have in selecting projects; hence the greater the 
vulnerability of the process to investment by bidding firms in socially 
unproductive influence As noted earlier, concern overa~tivities.~~ 
these difficulties was centrally at issue in the Pearson International 
Airport redevelopment, where, in part, ambiguity in the definition of 
required outputs buttressed concerns over the potential for patronage. 
The government could, of course, unbundle the design function 
from the other functions in the bundle and hold a separate design 
competition just for the ideas. Here again, however, the problems of 
stipulating with sufficient precision the outcome criteria against which 
competing designs are to be evaluated would arise. Indeed, government 
traditionally has often contracted out the design function for various 
public facilities, by hiring architectural or engineering firms to design 
public buildings or other facilities. In so doing, the government is able 
to utilize private sector firms with relevant technical expertise and 
significant investments in reputational capital, which reduce informa- 
tion asymmetries in the design process. However, in stimulating a 
vigorous competition for design ideas on an unbundled basis where the 
objective is to generate a detailed design which would then support a 
public tendering process of the traditional kind with respect to the 
construction of the facility that is the subject of the winning design, the 
government is likely to have to offer a large fee to the winning design 
proponent (given the 'winner takes all' nature of the competition), in 
order that participants in the design competition will find it rational to 
invest significant resources in developing a detailed design, given their 
expected return on this investment. In the context of defence procure- 
ment, William Rogerson speculates that public concerns over the 
magnitude (and scope for manipulation) of the ex post prize necessary 
to stimulate optimal ex ante investment in research supports a bundled 
tournament where this premium can be embedded in the production 
contract, thereby limiting public transparency of the prize.47 Often in 
the past, government has simply approached several architectural or 
other design firms, depending on the nature of the facility, and sought 
preliminary ideas, and then committed itself to one designer to develop 
46 The problem of influence activities in the context of a multi-stage auction process is 
briefly alluded to in Paul Milgrom 'Auctions and Bidding: A Primer' (1989) 3 J  of 
Ecm. Perspectives 3 ,  20. For a discussion of influence activities, see Paul Milgrom and 
John Roberts Economics, Organization and Managemat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall 1992) 1924 .  
47 Rogerson, supra, 71. 
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a detailed design. It is not clear that this process generates an optimal 
supply of the best design ideas, particularly in large infrastructure 
projects where different features of different design proposals may be 
attractive and the optimal design may be a combination of features 
from a number of proposals. In this case, losing bidders have to 
contemplate the possibility that the government will use some of their 
design ideas in the ultimate design, but that they will not be com-
pensated at all for these ideas (the problem of appropriability). Thus, 
in order to attract a significant number of detailed design proposals, 
only a large expected return reflecting an appropriate risk premium is 
likely to attract sufficient losing bidders from which to develop a 
combined set of design specifications. However, even in this case, 
bidders still face strong incentives to develop proposals that capitalize 
on their firm-specific advantages in production, even if the design that 
is ultimately produced is not least cost. In this way, bidders limit the 
capacity of government to transfer their design innovations to other 
bidders.48 
An alternative approacb to design production would be to commis- 
sion the preparation of a number of design proposals, probably on a 
fixed-fee basis; but now government may face a larger pay-out than 
under the winner-takes-all approach and, more seriously, would create 
no incentives (beyond reputation effects) for proponents to invest 
resources in developing superior rather than inferior design proposals. 
Information asymmetries may subvert the capacity of government to 
determine the level of effort expended in design development. 
The government faces many of these problems with the vertically 
integrated infrastructure provision model. That is to say, competing 
consortia are unlikely to have equal strengths across all the various 
functions in the bundle, yet the winning bidder must be chosen on the 
basis of some balance of strengths and weaknesses. Even if a number of 
the competing bidders have roughly equivalent strengths in the design 
function, for a large complex facility (such as an airport) it is unlikely 
to be the case that one consortium's design is superior in all respects to 
the others. Thus, ideally, the government would wish to combine the 
best features of the various competing design proposals. However, this 
48 In this respect, investment in these firmspecific design features bears analytical 
similarity to the entrenchment problem related to excessive investment by managers 
in manager-specific investments so as to limit the gains from displacement. See 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 'Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments' (1989) 25 J. ojFin. Econ. 123. 
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combination implies significant complications in the bidding and 
contracting process.49 In this respect, the vertically integrated model 
exhibits obvious tied sales properties. One option is to partly decouple 
the design competition from the other functions in the bundle by 
requiring all qualified, vertically integrated consortia first to submit 
their design proposals, on the assumption that it will still be in their 
interests subsequently to bid on the winning design (which may be 
another consortium's design proposal or represent a combination of 
features of the competing designs). Presumably, the consortium with 
the winning or predominant design proposal may feel it has infor- 
mational, technological, or other advantages over rival bidders in 
bidding on the remaining functions, and thus there is an incentive to 
prepare the design proposal which commends itself most to the 
government. Here again, as with an unbundled competition for design 
ideas, the cost of preparing a detailed design proposal for a large 
infrastructure project might be very substantial, but unlike an 
unbundled design competition there may be no direct compensation 
for the winning design. Moreover, by restricting the design function to 
consortia capable of bidding on the remaining functions, proposers in 
the design competition now face serious free-rider problems in that a 
rival consortium with an inferior design but superior construction and 
other capabilities may win the integrated bidding competition. These 
risks are likely to generate significant risk premiums in vertically 
integrated bids, given both the inherent costs of preparing such 
comprehensive bids and the appropriability problem with design 
innovations. They are also, as mentioned above, likely to result in 
49 	Some of these problems are revealed by the value engineering exercise that was 
incorporated into the Highway 407 selection process. After the first-stage design 
tournament, the government sought to pool the best design ideas submitted by each 
of the bidders into a baseline project description that could then serve as the basis 
for bidders to make more elaborate proposals in subsequent bidding stages. By 
increasing the common base of information available to bidders in a common values 
auction, uncertainty over the underlying value of goods is diminished, which should, 
in turn, enhance bidder competitiveness. Apart from its effect on competition, the 
exercise provided the public with an opportunity to express preferences over trade- 
offs in the design of the project, for example, between safety and cost. Nevertheless, 
value engineering is not unproblematic; recognizing that a bidder's best ideas will 
be appropriated for the benefit of all bidders in later-stage bidding over the 
production contract, consortium members have strong incentives to hold back their 
best ideas to protect their relative advantages. This effect may, however, be dulled by 
the fact that if a bidder withholds sound ideas from the first stage of the selection 
process, its ability to proceed to subsequent bidding stages may be jeopardized. 
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bidders making socially perverse investments that attempt to limit the 
ability of other bidders to exploit their design proposals. 
An alternative approach to mitigating these problems would be to 
deal with them at the contracting rather than at the bidding stage of 
the process. That is to say, bids on all functions - design, construction, 
financing, operation, and maintenance - could be solicited in a single 
competition, but the winner of the competition would thereby win the 
right merely to attempt to negotiate a contract thereafter with the 
government, in the process of negotiating which the government would 
be free to introduce design or other features of losing bidders' propo- 
sals. The winning bidder would then have to decide whether to accept 
these proposed changes to its proposal. But again, various problems 
present themselves. First, suppose the winning bidder does not accept 
all or any of the changes to its bid proposed by the government. 
Presumably, in the absence of a concluded contract, the government 
would be free to withdraw from negotiations and perhaps reapproach 
one of the other bidders. Or the government may behave more strategi- 
cally and play the winning bidder off against other bidders in the 
contract negotiations. Alternatively, the winning bidder could accept all 
or most of the changes proposed by the government and modify its bid, 
but losing bidders will not unreasonably complain that they should have 
been given a similar opportunity to modify their bids in the light of 
what is really a rolling or evolving set of contract specifications ('a 
moving target'). Moreover, once a government agency has precom- 
mitted to a particular bidder before negotiating the detailed contract, 
competitive pricing discipline is likely to be atten~ated.~' Thus, 
extracting from private sector firms in the competitive bidding process 
an optimal supply of innovative design ideas without attenuating 
competitive pricing discipline presents serious diff~culties. 
Beyond eliciting an optimal supply of ideas, the arguments for 
bundling the design function with other functions have some force. 
Under more traditional modes of developing infrastructure projects 
(and indeed building other facilities), it has been a common complaint 
that separating the design function (and personnel) from the construc- 
50 	Once the government has publicly announced its selection of a winning bidder, it is 
subject to political embarrassment if it is forced to reopen the bidding process in 
the event that it is unable to come to terms with that consortium, especially in a 
setting where concerns over project timeliness explain government's decision to opt 
for the public/private partnership in the first place. Concern over these political 
costs creates undesirable lock-in effects which tip the post-selection balance of 
bargaining power in favour of the winning consortium. 
tion function (and personnel) in different teams (hiring an architect to 
undertake the design of a building while contracting out its construc- 
tion to another firm, for instance) increases the risk that the designer 
will be insensitive to 'constructability' problems presented by his design. 
Given that 80% of the costs of many large-scale construction projects 
are estimated to be determined by the design, dissonances between the 
design and construction teams may prove very costly,51 although again 
it is not entirely clear why reputational markets for professional firms 
would not minimize these problems. In the vertically integrated infra- 
structure provision model, the design and construction teams form part 
of a larger team that is organized by the consortium undertaking the 
project, the premise being that the consortium is able to reduce 
coordination problems through internalizing these functions at lower 
cost than the public sector where it contracts out these functions 
separately. However, given that design and construction expertise are 
likely to reside in different groups of personnel and probably in 
different firms that are partners in the consortium, at most the 
coordination problems are minimized but not eliminated through this 
form of cooperation - presumably by more regular contact between the 
design and construction teams, by developing design and construction 
plans simultaneously and interactively rather than sequentially, and 
perhaps by repeat dealings between the two teams on different projects. 
c) Financing, design, and construction. The construction function on 
large public facilities has almost invariably been contracted out to the 
private sector, and so the vertically integrated infrastructure provision 
model represents no change in this respect. However, it does affect 
various interdependencies between the financing, design, and construc- 
tion functions by changing incentives in important ways. Most of these 
relate to how the project is to be financed and operated. If the private 
sector provider is itself to finance the construction of the facility and to 
recoup this investment and a return thereon out of subsequent user 
fees generated from operating the facility, the government has no 
direct concerns with the initial capital costs, provided that the design 
which the private sector provider has committed itself to, which will 
obviously reflect expected revenue constraints, is acceptable to the 
government. Alternatively, where the project is not to be financed at all 
or in its entirety from user fees, but wholly or in part from government 
51 See Issaka Ndekugri and Adrian Turner 'Building Procurement by Design and Build 
Approach' (1994) 120 J. of Construction Enginea'ng and Management 243. 
subsidies, then the government, by stipulating a maximum size of 
subsidy, will create similar constraints on feasible design and construe-
-
tion options. In contrast, the government is vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour in this context from the private sector provider given the 
'essential' nature of many infrastructure facilities and the likely political 
inability of a government simply to let such a facility fail, with the 
attendant disruption, pending government assuming full control of the 
facility or identifying another private sector operator. The private sector 
operator may well gamble that, notwithstanding an extravagant or 
misconceived design or excessive construction costs, it can coerce the 
government into relaxing constraints on user fees so as to permit 
monopoly pricing, or to raise the level of maximum committed sub- 
sidies. Thus, both the design and construction functions are highly 
sensitive to incentives created by the nature of the financing function. 
The nature of these cross-function incentive effects (interdependen- 
cies) are key to understanding what superficially may appear to be one 
of the major mysteries of private sector financing of infrastructure 
projects. In most cases, private sector financing will carry a higher cost 
of capital than government financing, simply because the default risk 
on sovereign debt (given that governments have access to the entire 
taxpayer base) is obviously lower than for a private sector infrastructure 
provider, where the cost of capital will reflect both project-specific risks 
and its de jure or de facto limited liability. Thus, if the financing 
function were viewed in isolation from the other functions, given the 
lower cost of sovereign debt relative to private sector debt, we should 
see governments financing all activities in the economy. The fact that 
they finance very few of these activities, at least in a market economy, 
requires an explanation. In the present context, the explanation 
appears to lie in the fact that while the cost of capital to the private 
sector infrastructure provider will be higher than the cost of an equival- 
ent amount of capital to the government (which has the same access to 
private capital markets), offsetting efficiency gains from the other 
functions performed by the private sector provider are influenced 
positively by virtue of the fact that it is bearing the financial risk on the 
project. However, this trade-off in turn depends upon how the capital 
investment is to be recouped. If the investment must be recouped from 
competitively determined revenues from the project, then this will 
create socially appropriate incentives with respect to the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of projects. While it may be 
true that governments and private sector infrastructure developers 
borrow capital from the same sources, lenders' incentives with respect 
to private sector project financing are sharply different. With the 
government as borrower, lenders can ignore project-specific returns, 
given that lenders ultimately have access to the government's entire tax 
and asset base. With project financing, project returns become central; 
lenders are likely to screen development consortia more carefully 
before lending, to insist on adequate security and financial penalties 
against non-completion or default, and to monitor performance more 
closely through the inclusion of numerous, tailored covenants than they 
would if they were lending to government which in turn then financed 
the project, thus significantly improving the performance of the 
infrastructure pr~vider.~' 
However, with respect to most forms of infrastructure, the infrastruc- 
ture operator is likely to possess some measure of market power and 
thus, in the absence of contractual restriction or regulation, may be 
able to charge monopolistic user fees. Given that even a monopolist has 
some incentive to maximize profits by minimizing costs, it is not 
obvious that this will change its calculus with respect to design, con- 
struction, operation, and maintenance costs or lenders' monitoring of 
these functions. However, if user fees are restricted or regulated by the 
government to prevent monopoly pricing, through some form of rate- 
of-return regulation, this may create incentives for the private sector 
provider to overcapitalize the project in order to expand the rate base 
or to exert weak controls over operating costs, given the cost-plus 
nature of this form of regulation. 
Another argument that is sometimes made for private sector financ- 
ing of infrastructure projects, notwithstanding the higher cost of private 
sector capital, is that this serves an economic certification or verification 
function, and that projects will only proceed that have a positive net 
present value to the provider, whereas the public sector in selecting 
projects will not necessarily feel so constrained. This argument has only 
qualified force. Obviously, a private sector provider, in making his 
calculus, will be influenced only by private costs and benefits. Where 
monopolistic setting of user charges is possible, a project may have a 
positive net value to him even though its social value may be negative, 
once the dead-weight social losses are taken into account. In contrast, if 
user charges were to be constrained by regulation to marginal cost 
(ideally marginal social costs, including congestion and environmental 
externalities), given the high ratio of fixed to variable costs entailed in 
52 See Ronald Daniels and George Triantis 'The Role of Debt in American Corporate 
Governance' (Summer 1995) U. of Calif: LR; William Pearson, President, Agra 
Engineering Group, Toronto, interview with the authors 1 September 1994. 
many infrastructure projects, revenues are unlikely to cover the costs of 
the project and to generate a positive net present value. A more 
complicated scheme of regulated prices, such as Ramsey prices, would 
permit price discrimination where prices are inversely related to 
elasticity of demand so that the marginal consumer is served, but 
average total costs are covered by charging inelastic demanders more 
than marginal costs. Thus, a private sector provider's judgement on the 
financial viability of a project is a useful check or discipline on a 
government's decision to proceed with such a project only if these 
pricing issues are clearly and appropriately resolved at the outset. Given 
that the government, albeit through negotiations with the private sector 
provider, will determine and administer these contractual or regulatory 
constraints on pricing, this to an important extent endogenizes govern- 
ment policy considerations in the private sector provider's calculus as to 
the economic viability of the project, and undermines this judgment as 
an independent second check on the social desirability of the project. 
Where a project is not to be financed entirely out of user fees, but 
partly or entirely from government operating subsidies, a private sector 
provider's judgment as to the financial viability of the project again is 
not an exogenous check on the government's decision to proceed with 
it, given that the government's decision over the nature and scale of 
the subsidies is endogenous to the private provider's calculus. 
Apart from the necessary relationship between the viability of the 
initial capital investment and subsequent options with respect to the 
pricing of services or the nature and size of government operating 
subsidies, a private sector provider's judgement about the financial 
viability of a project will reflect only private expected costs and benefits 
and not expected social costs and benefits. With many large infrastruc- 
ture projects, there are likely to be significant positive and negative 
externalities, which will not be reflected in this private calculus, but 
which government agencies overseeing the project may wish to consider 
in judging the social viability of the project or in containing or compen- 
sating for these externalities through other policies. A private sector 
firm's willingness to privately finance an infrastructure project may 
reflect a disregard for negative externalities. Conversely, an unwilling- 
ness to privately finance such a project may simply reflect an inability to 
capture or charge for the benefits of positive externalities. In both cases 
the private financing decision may not be congruent with a social 
welfare calculus. 
d) Operation and maintenance. With respect to the operating function, 
this could, like prior functions, be unbundled and contracted out 
discretely. Indeed, this is sometimes done with infrastructure. Presum- 
ably in this case, the government could simply enter into a manage- 
ment contract for a fixed term, probably accompanied by a lease of 
existing facilities for the same term, to a private sector provider chosen 
through a competitive tendering process in very much the way that 
Demsetz has argued is feasible in creating competition for natural 
monopoly markets.= Several well-known problems present themselves 
with this option.54 First, if the infrastructure facility has monopoly 
features to it entailing some degree of market power on the part of the 
operator, the government faces a choice between, on the one hand, 
maximizing the sale price of the franchise by allowing the operator to 
charge monopoly prices to users or, on the other hand, soliciting bids 
not on the basis of the highest franchise price but the lowest contrac- 
tually permitted set of user prices. Presumably the latter is the social 
ideal, in that it avoids the dead-weight losses associated with monopoly 
pricing, although it imposes a much more substantial burden on the 
public sector in reviewing and approving initial bids and monitoring 
adherence to price commitments thereafter and may have less attractive 
political properties than maximizing the franchise price. 
Under either form of competitive bidding, the winning bidder 
presumably has similar incentives to minimize costs over the period of 
the operating contract in order to maximize net profits. However, a 
major divergence between a private and social calculus in this respect 
relates to maintenance costs. Where the assets are long-lived, but the 
operating contract is of shorter duration, there are obvious incentives 
for the operator to skimp on maintenance or improvement costs where 
these will have little or no impact on the revenue stream until the post- 
contract period. This problem could, of course, be solved by making 
the initial operating contract the same length as the expected life of 
the assets, thus fully internalizing both the costs and benefits of expen- 
ditures on maintenance, although not necessarily capital improvements, 
replacements, or facility expansion where returns can only be realized 
thereon beyond the term of the contract. In many cases involving large- 
scale infrastructure, this internalization function may entail initial 
contracts of 50 or 60 years. Another advantage of integrating the 
design, construction, financing, and operating functions in these cases 
53 Harold Demsetz 'Why Regulate Utilities?' (1968) 11  J. ofI,aw &Econ. 55.  
54 For a review of these problems, see Keith Crocker and Scott Masters 'Regulation 
and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for 
Public Utility Regulation' J. of Econ. (forthcoming). 
is that the private provider will have an incentive to minimize the life- 
cycle costs of the project. Where initial capital investments and ongoing 
maintenance are substitutes for one another, less initial capital invest- 
ment results in higher subsequent maintenance and conversely. The 
optimal mix of the two functions is more likely to be selected by an 
integrated provider. However, technological uncertainties, uncertainties 
relating to market demand, and uncertainties relating to the durability 
or stability of surrounding government policies that may affect the costs 
or revenues generated by the project make these long-term contracts a 
much riskier proposition from the perspective of a private sector 
operator. In turn, the government will have committed itself for the life 
of the assets to a single operator, notwithstanding the possible subse- 
quent emergence of superior operators. While the government may 
attempt, in a long-term operating contract, to specify all performance 
obligations of the operator, over a long-term contract these are very 
difficult to specify completely ex ante and in any event are likely to 
entail intensive and costly monitoring. Short-term contracts reduce 
some of these problems (the difficulty of anticipating all future contin- 
gencies) while exacerbating others (the incentive to degrade the assets, 
for example). Moreover, while there is at least the potential for period- 
ic competitive retendering of the contract, as Williamson has pointed 
out, asset specificity - in this case, specialized human capital relating to 
the operation of a facility - may create considerable advantages for the 
incumbent at contract renewal junctures, and militate against the 
preservation of a competitive contracting en~i ronment .~~ 
More generally, the case for vertical integration of operation and 
maintenance with design, construction, and financing functions in the 
provision of infrastructure is that firms can coordinate these functions 
at lower cost than can the government; that the cross-function incentive 
effects of bundling functions (interdependencies) yield superior 
performance to more discrete forms of contracting out, that is, that 
decisions affecting the design and construction functions will be 
influenced by operating obligations, all of which will be affected by 
financing obligations; and that economies of scale and scope can be 
realized through integration. The empirical evidence tends to suggest 
that indeed vertically integrated private providers of infrastructure 
services can complete initial infrastructure construction much more 
55 Oliver Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press 1985) 
chapter 13 ('Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly'); see also Crocker and 
Masters, supra. 
quickly than can be done under the traditional mode of public provi- 
sion with discrete contracting out of particular functions, in large part 
because of reductions in transaction and coordination costs through a 
more simultaneous and less sequential construction process and greater 
freedom from stringent government budget allocation and procure- 
ment regulations.56 Yet, the value of this benefit should not be over- 
stated; for instance, in the Highway 407 project, it was alleged that use 
of the public/private partnership model enabled the government to 
reduce the time necessary to complete the project from a projected 20 
years through traditional procurement to 4.5 years. However, the 
principal factor behind the shortened construction period appears not 
to be any design or production efficiency but the government's deci- 
sion to use off-budget financing to increase the funding for the project 
from the original on-budget allocation. 
One important offsetting feature of vertical integration is likely to be 
a marked reduction in competition for infrastructure contracts, relative 
to more discrete or disaggregated contracting-out policies. Economies 
of both scale and scope are likely to be such that in bidding on large 
integrated infrastructure projects very few firms or consortia are likely 
to be able to assemble all the relevant specialized inputs.57 These 
problems are, of course, exacerbated when sponsoring governments 
impose domestic content restrictions on prospective bidders. Thus, one 
would predict a very small number of bidders on many of these con- 
tracts. In contrast, by contracting out the various functions involved in 
providing and operating infrastructure in a discrete or disaggregated 
form, it seems likely that the competitive bidding process with respect 
to each function is likely to attract significantly more bidders and to be 
correspondingly more vigorous. Empirical evidence with respect to 
government procurement generally suggests that increasing the number 
of bidders from three to four can result in savings of up to 18%;from 
seven to eight, up to 4%; and from ten to eleven, up to 2%.58 The 
World Bank's Infrastructure for Development report, in relation to what 
have hitherto been treated as natural monopolies (electricity and 
telecommunications, for example), argues strongly for unbundling 
these activities, vertically in the case of electricity by unbundling 
generation from transmission and distribution, and horizontally in the 
case of telecommunications by unbundling local from long-distance 
56 Ndekugri and Turner, supra note 51, 250. 

57 See Sappington and Stiglitz, supra note 44, 571, 572. 

58 McAfee and McMillan, supra note 41, 151. 
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service and cellular or radio paging services, in order to stimulate 
greater c~mpetition.~' While full vertical integration of the provision 
of major infrastructure facilities, which the World Bank appears to 
favour in other cases, may offer offsetting economic advantages, it may 
well entail highly attenuated competition at the bidding stage of the 
process (and even less at recontracting intervals), as well as monopoly 
provision of all services provided through the facility thereafter by the 
winning bidder or parties to whom it in turn has granted exclusive or 
monopoly sub-franchises. Nevertheless, if the production of new design 
ideas can impact materially on the final value of a proposed project, if 
the nature of those ideas cannot be easily specified in advance, and if 
explicit prizes for innovative designs cannot be awarded without 
attracting political controversy, then restrictions on the number of 
entrants competing in the selection process (by, for instance, insisting 
on bundled services) increase the value of the expected premium, and 
elicit increased research e f f ~ r t . ~  
C. DISTRIBUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Distributional considerations arising from the privatization of infrastruc- 
ture services are likely to vary widely, depending upon the nature of the 
service in question. Where the services have previously entailed substan- 
tial cross-subsidies under public provision, for example to rural or low- 
income users, these are likely to disappear under an unconstrained, 
fully vertically integrated private provision model,6' and thus will 
provoke resistance to the adoption of this model. Indeed, under such a 
model adverse distributional effects may be exacerbated if the elasticity 
of demand by these groups is low, reflecting the absence of choices, 
thus permitting monopoly pricing or price discrimination. The private 
sector provider may, of course, be required to maintain these cross- 
subsidies through ongoing contractual or regulatory constraints. 
However, these constraints are likely to make it less attractive for private 
sector operators to invest in such projects and, even where investment 
is feasible, will entail the government in complex, ongoing contractual 
or regulatory oversight. The empirical evidence suggests that at some 
59 World Bank, supra note 2, 53, 54. 
60 Curtis Taylor, supra note 45: 'Because equilibrium research effort by each firm 
increases with the size of the prize and decreases with the number of contestants, 
there is a one-tc-one correspondence between choosing the optimal prize and entry 
fee and choosing the optimal number of contestants and equilibrium effort level.' 
61 See John Vickers and George Yarrow 'Economic Perspectives on Privatization' 
(1991) 5 J. of Econ. Perspectives 11 1, 114. 
point detailed regulatory oversight of a private utility or other infra- 
structure facility operator is likely to yield performance characteristics 
not sharply different from those of a public enterpri~e.~'Thus, 
privatization may offer few advantages where the government is com- 
mitted to maintaining existing subsidy policies (other than through 
direct transfers). 
Other constituencies whose interests may be jeopardized by 
privatization of infrastructure services are members of public sector 
labour unions who have been employed in the operation of existing 
infrastructure facilities that are to be privatized. After privatization, they 
may face lay-offs, lower remuneration, less job security, and more 
flexible or more demanding job assignments. 
Other constituencies that may be at risk from privatization are both 
commercial and retail customers, who face the risk of monopolistic 
pricing of user charges by the private sector service provider if not 
otherwise constrained either in the initial contract between the govern- 
ment and the provider or by ongoing regulation. Given the essential na- 
ture of many infrastructure services, demand for these services is often 
inelastic and is likely to support a significant degree of monopoly 
pricing. 
Still another constituency that may perceive itself as prejudiced by 
the privatization of infrastructure services is environmental and related 
groups who may see private sector developers and operators of certain 
kind of infrastructure facilities, for example toll roads or airports, as 
being more likely than public sector providers to discount environ- 
mental and related negative e~ternalities.~" 
A more general and amorphous constituency that may be opposed 
to the privatization of existing infrastructure facilities accompanied by 
the imposition of user charges are present users who perceive them- 
selves as having already paid for the facility through various kinds of 
taxes and are unlikely to be impressed by arguments as to the efficiency 
of the price mechanism in rationing access to scarce or over-utilized 
resources. 
All of these constituencies are likely to translate the distributional 
and other impacts that they are likely to bear from privatization into 
political resistance to the process. With a number of these constituen- 
cies (labour or users) the resistance is likely to be !ess in the case of the 
privatization of new infrastructure facilities than with existing infrastruc- 
ture facilities. This is particularly likely to be the case where the govern- 
62 Hirshhorn, supra note 42, 13, 21. 

63 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, supra note 42, 205. 

ment is able to persuade voters and interest groups that the facilities 
are unlikely to be built at all in the absence of privatization. However, 
the opportunities for ~rofitable private development and operation of 
new infrastructure (highways, for example), especially in developed 
economies where most essential infrastructure already exists, may be 
very limited.64 As well, development of new infrastructure facilities is 
likely to exacerbate the concerns of environmental and similar groups, 
relative to the privatization of existing facilities, given the incremental 
negative environmental impacts or at least 'Nimby' effects that addi- 
tions to infrastructure are likely in many cases to generate. 
On the other hand, privatization of infrastructure services offers 
some political attractions to government. The most prominent attrac- 
tion is that it enables governments in a period of budget deficits and an 
environment of fiscal restraint in many countries to move major capital 
expenditures on new infrastructure off-budget or to capitalize existing 
infrastructure by sell-offs to the private sector. However, two important 
caveats are warranted in this context. First, as noted above, govern- 
ments, even severely overcommitted governments, can typically borrow 
more cheaply than the private sector, so that from a social perspective, 
the case for privatizing infrastructure provision, including the financing 
function, necessarily turns on the various efficiency and incentive 
effects, described above, that flow from integrating the financing 
function with other functions to be performed by the private sector 
service provider. The second caveat is that the public sector technically 
is as capable as the private sector of imposing user charges for its 
services. Thus, if investment in an infrastructure project has a positive 
net present value, taking into account the revenues that it will generate, 
the net long-term worth of the public sector may not be enhanced, and 
could conceivably be reduced, by full privatization of an infrastructure 
facility.65 Unfortunately, because of the manner in which public ac- 
counts are maintained by governments in many countries (cash rather 
than accrual accounting), moving the initial capital investment off- 
budget or capitalizing existing infrastructure, while not simultaneously 
reporting forgone future revenues, encourages a form of fiscal illusion 
which may fool some taxpayers and citizens concerned with the size of 
the current budget deficit.66 
64 Hirshhorn, supra note 42, 1. 
65 See Oliver Williamson 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex- 
change' (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519. 
66 See Jack Mintz and Ross Preston (eds) CapitalBudgeting in the Public Sector (Kingston, 
Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for Study of Economic Policy 1993). 
Another political attraction of privatization of infrastructure services 
is that it enables 'hands tying' or credible commitments with respect to 
a range of policy-related risks that relate to both the financial viability 
and in some cases social benefits of a project.67 For example, the 
World Bank reports that failure to maintain existing basic infrastructure 
in many developing countries has proved a more costly policy short- 
coming than failure to invest in new infrastructure, at least in terms of 
the return on the This shortcoming investments i n v ~ l v e d . ~  seems 
largely explained by the inability of governments to commit resources, 
on a long-term basis, to infrastructure maintenance in the face of more 
pressing day-to-day political or other demands on public resources. By 
privatizing, on a vertically integrated basis, the provision of infrastruc- 
ture, an ongoing commitment to maintenance of the assets (subject to 
the difficulties noted above) can be built into the arrangement. Similar- 
ly, pricing and subsidy policies can be rendered more stable and 
predictable by embodying them in contractual commitments between 
the government and private sector providers, and thus made more 
resistant to the whims of the political process.69 On the one hand, 
without strong ex ante commitments in these areas, private sector 
providers, having incurred large sunk costs in the initial capital invest- 
ment, are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by government in 
changing the rules of the game ex post, which will increase risk pre- 
miums demanded ex ante or at the limit discourage more risk-averse 
firms from bidding at On the other hand, in order to protect or 
enhance the private sector provider's revenue stream, the government 
may be tempted to make anticompetitive commitments which may en- 
hance the government's return on the contract, for example, a commit- 
ment not to build other competitive facilities, or to permit monopoly 
pricing of user charges, or to relax environmental constraints, where in 
each case social welfare may be impaired. But the government, by 
distancing itself from service provision and tying its hands, short of 
legislating cancellation or modification of the contract and arguably 
risking claims for compensation, can deflect some of the political costs 
that it might otherwise have to confront if it pursued these policies 
itself as a public operator. 
67 World Bank, supra note 2, 27, 29. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Pablo Spiller 'Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities Privatization' 
(1993) 2 Industrial @ Cmporate Change 387. 
70 Vickers and Yarrow, supra note 61, 114; Sappington and Stiglitz, supra note 44, 574 
and 580. 
Another political advantage of privatizing infrastructure provision in 
a period of fiscal constraint is that it permits employment creation in 
depressed labour markets without committing additional public re-
sources to this objective (albeit again something of a fiscal illusion if 
the government is forgoing subsequent revenues from the facility). The 
empirical evidence suggests, as noted above, that fully vertically inte- 
grated private infrastructure providers can complete major infrastruc- 
ture projects much more quickly than public provision under the 
traditional disaggregated form of contracting out. Thus, under pri- 
vatization, jobs in the initial construction phase of the facility can be 
created more quickly than under public provision. Whether all of these 
jobs should be counted as net increments to the labour force may again 
be largely a fiscal illusion. Given that private sector infrastructure 
providers simply draw on existing sources of domestic and international 
capital and do not in themselves expand the pool of savings and capital 
in the economy, it should probably be assumed that most of these pro- 
jects involve diverting capital from one activity to another where the 
expected private return is higher.71 In terms of job creation effects, 
the net effect, while more concentrated and visible, may be quite 
ambiguous. 
A final argument for privatization of infrastructure services is an 
infant-industry argument. By governments privatizing the provision of 
such services to domestic private providers or consortia, the develop 
ment of the necessary qualities of specialized expertise and the resolu- 
tion or minimization of coordination problems in large multidiscip 
linary teams can be advanced by a process of learning-bydoing. Given 
the size of the global market for infrastructure projects described by the 
World Bank in its recent report, providing infrastructure services may 
develop into a major export market. However, implicit in this argument 
is that governments in awarding infrastructure contracts should adopt 
an explicit preference in favour of domestic firms, even where foreign 
firms could provide a superior or cheaper service, thus 'taxing' domes- 
tic users or taxpayers, directly or indirectly, in the short run. As with 
infant-industry arguments that have been invoked over the past century 
to justify trade protectionism in various contexts,72 such policies may 
promote and preserve firms or industries that have a long-term com- 
parative disadvantage and the 'tax' on users or taxpayers equally 
71 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, supra note 42, 101. 
72 See Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock The Regulation of Intaational Trade 
(London: Routledge 1995) chapter 1.  
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becomes permanent. In addition, the increasingly stringent government 
procurement and foreign investment provisions that have been adopted 
in NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreement of the GATT may in some 
cases elicit justifiable complaints by foreign governments or firms of 
di~crimination.~' 
D. THE STATUS OF GOVERNMENT AS A PARTY TO THE PARTNERSHIP 
CONTRACT 
So far, we have emphasized the problems inhering in public/private 
partnerships owing to the nature of infrastructure assets, and the 
distinct design problems related thereto. However, as alluded to earlier, 
a fundamental problem for these partnerships relates to the status of 
government as a party to the contracts. Because of its inherent legisla- 
tive powers, government involvement presents distinct and quite vexing 
contracting problems.74 First, particularly in countries such as Canada 
that lack constitutionally entrenched property rights, governments are 
able to abrogate express contractual commitments through legislative 
fiat. In other words, even where the contracting parties have been able 
to anticipate and to contract ex ante for the risks of future acts of 
contractual opportunism by government, the ability of governments to 
nullify these contracts through express legislative amendment attenu- 
ates the degree to which private parties can rely on governmental 
contractual ~ndertakin~s.~%onse~uentl~,the value of even an express 
contractual commitment to provide fair compensation in the event of a 
73 Ibid. chapters 6 and 11. 
74 The lack of institutional safeguards against government takings is interpreted by 
Douglass North as a critical constraint on the pace of national economic develop 
ment. See Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); and Douglass C. North and Barry R. 
Weingast 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England' (1989) 49 J of Econ. Hist. 803. See 
also Spiller, supra note 69, 387; Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller 'Regulation, Institu- 
tions, and Commitment in Telecommunications' in Proceedings of the World Bank 
Conference on Deuelujnnent Economics (Washington, DC: The World Bank 1994); and 
Pablo Spiller and Ingo Vogelsang 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment in the UK' draft paper dated 16 June 1994, on file with the authors. 
75 	This is the paradox of sovereignty. The 'greater the sovereign's ability to impel 
submission by citizens, the less the ability of a third-party arbiter to compel perform- 
ance by the sovereign, and so the less the sovereign's ability to induce voluntary 
cooperation. This paradox turns the sovereign's power into the sovereign's handicap.' David 
D. Haddock ' ~ o r k s e e i n ~  Confiscation bythe-sovereign: Lessons from the American 
West' in Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill (eds) The Political Economy o j  the 
American West (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 1994) (emphasis added). 
'taking' is subject to doubt. Second, even where governments face 
constitutional or other institutional constraints on their power to 
confiscate outright the undertaking of a private owner/operator, 
considerable contractual design problems emanating from the breadth 
of governmental policy powers remain. Here, it is difficult ex ante for 
parties to anticipate the myriad ways in which governments can infringe 
the franchise value of the private investor. Simple cases, such as when 
government transfers title or establishes a competitor to the investor, 
can be anticipated in advance, and can be restrained by the judiciary. 
However, beyond these simple cases, the task of design is rendered 
much more difficult. For instance, in the case of an asset like an airport 
terminal, changes in transportation, environmental, occupational health 
and safety, or regional development policy could all adversely impact 
the franchise value of the undertaking. Not only is the range of possible 
'takings' difficult to anticipate in advance, but it is also difficult to 
differentiate legitimate governmental actions from those actions which 
are nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to debase the value of 
the investors' interests, leaving investors with little choice but to tender 
their interests in the project to government on exploitative terms. 
The problem in differentiating permissible from impermissible 
governmental modifications of state contractual commitments is 
graphically illustrated by the experience of the United States Supreme 
Court in interpreting the Constitution's contract clause, which prohibits 
states from enacting laws impairing the obligation of c~ntracts.~"he 
clause was first interpreted by the Court in cases involving public 
grants, such as Fletcher v. Peck,77 and Dartmouth College v. Woodw~rd,~~ 
wherein the Court prevented state governments from abrogating con- 
tractual obligations that were explicitly made to private beneficiaries. 
However, by 1837, the Court began to retreat from an expansive 
interpretation of the contract clause, by, for instance, declining to 
incorporate into a toll-bridge charter an implied promise by a state not 
to authorize construction of a competing bridge, even though this 
would severely affect the value of the franchise that had been 
76 Article 1, subsection 10 of the Constitution. Although there is no explicit constitu- 
tional provision that imposes a similar constraint on the federal government, it is 
arguable that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause may have (or had) this 
effect: see Laurence Tribe A d c a n  Constitutional Law 2d ed. (Mineola, NY The 
Foundation Press 1988) 613nl. See also Bowen v. Public Agencies 477 US 41 (1986). 
77 6 Cranch (10 US) 87 (1810). 
78 4 Wheat. (17 US) 518 (1819). 
awarded." By the late 1930s, the clause fell into virtual disuse, a 
situation which was not reversed until the Court's decision in 1977 in 
United States Trust Co. of New Yorlz v. NewJersy.'O In that case, the Court 
prohibited New Jersey and New York from repealing a statutory cove- 
nant that earmarked certain revenues and reserves from rail transporta- 
tion as security for state borrowings. The states sought to use the funds 
to subsidize rail passenger transportation. The Court held that the 
contract impairment was not reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose, in this case, state transportation, energy, and 
environmental goals." Nevertheless, under the US Trust Co. doctrine, 
it is clear that cases involving more subtle debasement of the state 
contractual or quasicontractual commitments could still withstand 
constitutional scrutiny where the end to be achieved could not be 
achieved through alternative means." 
In any event, as demonstrated by the federal government's decision 
to abrogate its contractual commitments to the Pearson Development 
Corporation in respect of the TIT2 development, it is clear that the 
scope for governmental modification (or abrogation) of state franchise 
contracts is more than speculative. This problem of government 
opportunism is, however, by no means novel in Canada. In an exhaus- 
tive analysis of the performance of long-term franchise contracts 
governing natural monopolies in a range of different industries (elec- 
tricity, railways, telephony, tramways, water, and gas) from the mid- 
1800s to the 1930s in Canada, John Baldwin argues that infirmities in 
the institutional environment enabled governments to exploit o p  
portunistically the sunk investment costs of franchise operators, ulti- 
mately leading to a general contractual failure that resulted in a form 
of vertical integration that linked consumers and suppliers, namely 
high levels of state ownership of such assets.'"aldwin cites several 
79 Charks River Bd g e v .  Warren Bridge 36 US (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
80 431 US 1 (1977). 
81 In subsequent cases, the Court has emphasized that state abrogation of its own 
contractual commitments will attract considerably less curial deference than state 
legislative interference with private contracts generally. See, for instance, Keystone 
Bitminous Coal Assn. v. deBenedictis 480 US 470 (1987). 
82 For an analysis of the revival of the contract clause see Bernard Schwartz 'Old Wine 
in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract Clause' in Philip B. Kurland and 
Gerhard Casper (eds) The Supreme Court Reuiew (1979) 95-122; and Richard A. 
Epstein 'Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause' (1984) 51 U. Chi. I 3  703. 
83 John Baldwin Regulatory Failure and Raewal: The Evolution of the Natural Monopoly 
Contract (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada 1989); see also Christopher Arm- 
strong and H.V. Nelles Monopoly's Momat: The Organization and Regulation of 
Canadian Utilities 1830-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1986). 
examples of contractual failure leading to nationalization: the decision 
by the federal Board of Railway Commissioners to limit the freight rates 
charged by private railways during a period of rapid price inflation, 
resulting in the demise and nationalization of two major railways;R4 the 
Manitoba legislature's threatened imposition of a discriminatory tax on 
Bell Canada's operations in the province as a prelude to nationalization 
by the province;s5 and the Ontario legislature's use of legislative 
amendments designed to abrogate contractual and legislative commit- 
ments made to investors in power generation and distribution, electric 
tramway, and electric lighting franchises; all in an effort to bolster the 
prospects of a newly created provincial electric utility - Ontario 
Hydro." Baldwin's claim is that the source of the failure of private 
franchise contracts in Canada resides in weak judicial traditions (specifi- 
cally, a failure to regard governmental action other than an outright 
taking of title as a taking) and the absence of constitutional protection 
for property rights.87 Had the institutional regime been structured 
differently, Baldwin speculates that private ownership subject to regula- 
tory oversight would have been a viable substitute for nationalization -
a course of evolution more typically followed in the United States.88 
Interestingly, many of the franchise contracts concluded during the 
period of Baldwin's study had properties strikingly similar to the 
publidprivate partnerships observed today. The contracts were long 
term, involved durable assets in areas where technology and demand 
conditions were changing or, at least, somewhat uncertain, and often 
contemplated government equity interests in the project through a 
fixed or varying level of participation in gross revenues. Further, the 
contracts, at least in the initial stages of their evolution, specified the 
obligations of the parties in vague, aspirational terms, a feature which 
ultimately forced the parties to develop more elaborate contractual 
mechanisms (through more detailed specification of terms and the 
creation of arbitral governance mechanisms) that would deal with 
84 Grand Trunk and Canadian Northern. See discussion in Baldwin, supra, chapter 4. 
85 Baldwin, supra note 83, 73-4. 
86 To be fair, the government's actions followed a series of failed attempts to compel 
the electric rail and lighting franchisees to abide by the terms of their earlier 
contract. See discussion in Baldwin, supra note 83, chapter 10. 
87 Many of these same themes are developed by George Priest 'The Origins of Utility 
Regulation and the Theories of Regulation Debate' (1993) 36 J. @Law UEcon. 289. 
88 See also George Priest, supra. In contrast, Spiller argues that some countries were 
able to achieve significant levels of governmental commitment in respect of upfront 
private sector investments by relying on judicial enforcement of governmental 
licences. However, this mechanism imposed costs in terms of forgone adjustment to 
changing circumstances (Spiller, supra note 69). 
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adjustment to changing contracting conditions, both on renewal and 
before.8g The question then arises as to whether the current institu- 
tional environment renders the contractual adjustment problems 
studied by Baldwin moot. While the role of the judiciary in constraining 
governmental opportunism through contractual interpretation is 
subject to debate, there is still no constitutionally entrenched contract 
or property rights clause in Canada, attenuating the constraints that 
could be imposed on government. Moreover, while certain interna-
tional obligations (chapter 10 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, for example) constrain governmental actions in respect of 
procurement decisions, the constraints on ex post governmental action 
are much weaker.g0 
Given the dearth of formalized institutional constraints on govern- 
mental opportunism, what constraints will currently operate to ensure 
governmental fidelity to contractual undertakings set out in the public/ 
private partnerships? One possibility is that governments will provide 
hostages to support the initiative^.^' For instance, to the extent that 
private sector operators have developed considerable expertise in the 
operation and maintenance of the projects as a result of learning, then 
the decision to expropriate the franchise may imperil these human 
capital investments. Alternatively, depending on the operation of 
reputational markets, a decision by the government to expropriate the 
undertaking may damage its reputational investment, and raise the 
costs to it of contracting with subsequent parties." Of course, to be 
effective, third parties must be able to observe the government's 
conduct and discern that it is opportunistic in character. To the extent 
that public/private partnerships are not one-off affairs, but rather are a 
frequent and predictable component of government policy-making, 
then the costs to government opportunism, in terms of forgone future 
benefits, should be correspondingly increased. In this respect, it is 
arguable that the current costs to government of impairing its obliga- 
89 The same point is made by Priest, supra note 87, who argues that the theories used 
to explain the role of regulation in natural monopolies (public interest or industry 
capture) ignore the functional similarity between regulation by public commission 
and several contractual innovations found in long-term franchise contracts. 
90 See Evan Atwood and Michael Trebilcock 'Public Accountability in an Age of 
Contracting Out' Can. Bus. LJ (forthcoming). 
91 Oliver Williamson 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange' 
(1983) 73 Am. Econ. Reu. 519. 
92 For a general discussion of the operation of reputational markets, see David Charny 
'Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relations' (1990) 104 Ham. LR 373. 
tions to holders of debt of public/private partnership are much greater 
than to the equityholders. In the former case, whether expressly 
guaranteed or not, impairment of a debt obligation associated with a 
public/private partnership could have dramatic and severe effects on 
government's capacity to finance its broader borrowing^.^^ 
Yet reputational mechanisms alone may not be a sufficient constraint 
on governmental oppor t~n i sm.~~  One possible response is to develop 
institutions that are capable of augmenting the restraints imposed by 
reputational markets. That is, at the time of contract formation, 
government could commission an arm's-length review of the contract to 
certify the integrity of the selection process, the contract's congruence 
with the proposal submitted by the winning bidder (recall the lock-in 
problems relating to the lag period between the decision to award the 
contract and the actual execution of the contract), and the compatibil- 
ity of the project with applicable public goals and concerns. Alternative- 
ly, and less ambitiously, the evaluation panel that oversaw the selection 
process could be required to write and release publicly a summary of 
their evaluations of the competing bids and their reasons for preferring 
the winning bidder over the remaining bidders. Assuming that a project 
has been vetted and vindicated through such a review process, the costs 
to government abrogation of the contract on grounds of alleged 
process or substantive frailties should be magnified considerably. 
Another option is to limit independent review to ex post evaluation -
that is, only those cases where government decides to renege on its 
contractual undertakings. While such review might economize on the 
costs of certification, these savings would come at the cost of 
heightened private sector uncertainty respecting the status of the 
contracts. In any event, if government does opt for a regime predicated 
on ex post review, the process would have to be considerably more 
rigorous and objective than the highly politicized process invoked by 
the federal government to analyse the TIT2 airport deal. 
93 Interestingly, the interests between equity and debt holders in respect of a confisca- 
tion of an infrastructure undertaking may diverge quite radically, to the extent that 
government appropriates the equity investment only. In this case, the default risk to 
debt holders will be reduced by having government more closely associated with the 
undertaking, thereby enhancing the underlying value of debt. Conversation with 
Duncan MacCallum, Gordon Capital, October 1994. 
94 Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign 
Debt' (1989) 97 J. of Pol. Econ. 155 (more complex institutional arrangements 
necessary to support state opportunism than reputation alone). 
In considering the desirability of these measures, it is important to 
stress that ex post constraints on government conduct, such as manda- 
tory compensation based on expectation damages, may prove eEca- 
cious only in respect of relatively stark types of governmental opportun- 
ism. For more subtle types of impairment, that is, takings through 
generalized policy initiatives, the case for conferring explicit protection 
on parties making infrastructural investments seems no different in 
kind from the case that obtains for actors having made investments in 
other industries, the value of which are subject to change as the result 
of government policy changes. In these cases, Kaplow has argued 
persuasively that government compensation for losses occasioned by 
regulatory change is undesirable as it would distort incentives for 
market-based risk management.95 But so long as government continues 
to own infrastructure assets that are similar in character to those subject 
to public/private partnerships, then the incentive for opportunistic 
expropriation through generalized (non-targeted) initiatives is 
reduced.96 This is because government will suffer losses on its infra- 
structure investments similar in character to losses sustained by private 
infrastructure investors. 
Nevertheless, for relatively stark takings, the case for some type of 
protection through expectation damages or injunction is more robust. 
To the extent that legal and non-legal sanctions are inadequate, 
investors will rely on the pricing mechanism to protect their interests -
that is, by impounding the expected cost of confiscatory action by 
government into the price that the investor is willing to pay for the 
franchise. Under this scenario, the costs of future expected opportun- 
ism are reflected back onto government in the form of a lowered rate 
of return to government from the proposed infrastructure project or a 
higher expected risk premium. Alternatively, private investors may need 
95 Lewis Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions' (1986) 99 Haw.  LR 509. 
Contrary views of the scope of government obligation in respect of generalized 
takings are developed in M. Graetz 'Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in 
Income Tax Revision' (1977) 126 U. Pa. LR 47; and J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru 
Nakazato 'Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz 
and Kaplow' (1989) 75 Va. LR 1155. 
96 This, of course, assumes that governmental actors respond to financial incentives in 
the same way that private actors do. See discussion in David Cohen 'Regulating 
Regulators: The Legal Environment of the State' (1990) 40 UTLJ 213; and 'Suing 
the State' (1990) 40 UTLJ 630 (government officials have only weak incentives to 
minimize costs, as excess costs can be transferred to taxpayers or to different 
institutions of government). However, for a contrary view, see H. Kee 'Incentives 
and Rewards in the Public Sector' (1986) 29 Can. Pub. Admin. 545. 
to be induced into making up-front investments by government sub- 
sidies (perhaps in the form of transfers of assets having an ongoing 
stream of earnings) and/or financing guarantees to generate needed 
equity funds. Both of these responses result in more highly leveraged 
capital structures that induce excessive risk taking by project man-
agers.'' A final pricing-related strategy is for project managers to 
compress the payback period for investment, which may have distortion- 
ary effects on risk taking and/or on capital structure. In any event, it is 
important to stress that from the perspective of a government that is 
intent on keeping its promises, the inability to credibly commit its 
intent is costly, and heightens the importance of devising workable and 
durable institutional mechanisms that are responsive to this problem.g8 
IV Conclusion 
A central theme of this study has been the considerable complexity 
entailed in the use of public/private partnerships designed to realize 
productive efficiency gains in the development and operation of 
physical infrastructure projects. In all of the case studies we explored, 
the details of the institutional and contractual framework proved 
central in determining whether the infrastructure projects were likely to 
generate welfare gains over alternative modes of organization. Since, 
save for one of the projects we examined, all of the case studies devel- 
oped in the study are in the design or construction stages, the task of 
evaluating the long-term efficiency consequences of these arrangements 
is somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, examination of the incentive 
effects of both the selection processes and the contracts involved in 
these projects provides a foundation upon which reasonably robust 
conclusions can be drawn about the likely performance of these 
projects, and the broader implications for policy-makers seeking to 
enhance the efficient delivery and operation of physical infrastructure, 
both in developed and developing countries. 
Commencing with the project selection stage, a first important lesson 
concerns the premium that policy-makers should place on responsible 
project selection through explicit and searching cost-benefit analysis. 
Whatever the merits of arguments which purport to link infrastructure 
97 Importantly, because of explicit or implicit government guarantees, creditors may be 
indifferent to socially excessive levels of risk taking, and will not devise restrictive 
covenants on project managers. 
98 See Spiller, supra note 69. 
with productivity more broadly, it is clear that in a setting of scarce 
resources, policy-makers will be required to make choices among 
competing infrastructure projects. While some have advocated the use 
of public/private partnerships as a means of certifying or confirming 
the alleged welfare properties of proposed projects, the design of the 
arrangements governing the projects analysed in the case studies 
demonstrates the limited value of such an enterprise. Each of the 
projects studied reveal important - albeit sharply varying - levels of 
embedded public financial assistance. As argued earlier, once the state 
insinuates itself into these projects by, for instance, providing assur- 
ances of annual subsidies or of subsidies conditioned on the project's 
underlying financial performance, the market's capacity to undertake 
an independent valuation of the project is compromised. The problem 
with relying on private markets to make these quintessentially public 
choices was graphically illustrated in the study of the PEI Fixed Link, 
where policy-makers misleadingly touted the private sector's interest in 
the highly subsidized project as objective and tangible evidence of its 
societal value. Yet in the light of the various rationales for intervention 
enumerated in the first part of this study, the market's capacity to make 
legitimate judgments respecting the underlying social value of these 
projects, even when unclouded by state financial assistance, is of 
dubious value. 
Assuming that threshold problems of general project selection can 
be surmounted (that is, that the most valuable projects are selected for 
development in descending order of their social value), and further 
that a public/private partnership model constitutes the best means of 
organizing the project, then the next challenge is to devise a process 
that can identify the most deserving project and/or developer/opera- 
tor, while ensuring fidelity to political legitimacy concerns. In consider- 
ing this issue, it is important to emphasize the role that auctions play in 
economizing on endemic information problems when valuing highly 
idiosyncratic assets. In all of the infrastructure projects that were 
examined, there were no obvious benchmarks that policy-makers could 
invoke to determine what the minimum return necessary was to entice 
private developers to deliver and operate these projects; hence, the 
attraction of the competitive auction. 
Nevertheless, the traditional information revelation function of 
auctions is best served when the good subject to allocation is stable and 
well defined. But, the highly bundled character of most public/private 
partnerships poses formidable problems for the design of a competitive 
bidding process. On the one hand, through reliance on vague and 
nebulous project definitions and standards, bidders will have the 
latitude necessary to propose novel solutions in response to the govern- 
ment's request. Under a more rigid bid structure, the prospect that 
these ideas would be created and then developed into a concrete 
proposal would be rendered much more remote. Quite simply, if the 
narrow and quite detailed standards enumerated in traditional govern- 
ment procurement competitions were to be used to develop large-scale 
infrastructure, the room for private sector innovation and creativity 
would be very considerably circumscribed. On the other hand, the less 
crystallized the project, the more expensive it will be for bidders to 
participate in the process. This expense derives from the out-of-pocket 
costs that bidders must incur in incorporating a creative design compo- 
nent into the proposal process and the risk that decision-makers will 
evaluate proposed projects on factors unrelated to the underlying 
merits of the proposal. As these ex ante bidding expenses increase in 
magnitude, so too does the need for ex ante compensation necessary to 
entice bidders to participate in the process in the first place. In other 
words, ideas matter, but the government will have to pay for them one 
way or another, and the question really is how that price is best paid. 
So far, the merits of the multidimensional auction process for public 
infrastructure projects has been viewed from a strictly efficiency per- 
spective. But given the high levels of public funding typically involved 
in these projects, it is important to be cognizant of the important 
political legitimacy values that are implicated. One need only recall the 
rather intense outpouring of public sentiment surrounding the redevel- 
opment of the Pearson terminals to realize the centrality of these values 
in this area. Here, it is apparent that even if there are tangible effi- 
ciency gains that can be realized through a multidimensional bidding 
process, the public's inability to monitor systematically the selection 
process involved in the allocation of projects costing upwards of a half 
a billion dollars becomes salient. 
Assuming that infrastructure projects can be allocated to the most 
deserving bidder through the auction process, the next, and most 
daunting, problem relates to the contractual design mechanisms used 
to alleviate the opportunism problems inhering in these projects. One 
of the major problems that must be confronted in these partnerships 
relates to asset degradation, which reflects the fact that these physical 
infrastructure projects typically have expected lives which extend well 
beyond the term of the lease, and which thus create troubling incen- 
tives for chiselling on asset maintenance. The costs of devising and 
enforcing contractual solutions to temper these problems must be 
balanced against the efficiency gains sought to be realized through the 
public/private partnership. 
In determining whether the public/private model is a suitable means 
for organizing production of a specific physical infrastructure project, it 
is useful to highlight what these precise efficiency gains are. As dis-
cussed earlier, the principal benefit of the public/private partnership 
over traditional procurement models in the delivery of physical infra- 
structure resides in the bundling or integration of the finance, design, 
construction, and operating functions. Integration promotes the forma- 
tion of cross-functional expertise and also ensures more disciplined 
performance of these functions than would be observed were govern- 
ment required to separately contract for the performance of each 
function on its own. Nevertheless, the case studies developed in this 
article raise doubts surrounding the likelihood of these benefits being 
realized on the scale contemplated by their proponents. 
The most significant problem stems from de facto unbundling of the 
bundled partnership. Again, a striking, indeed recurrent, feature of the 
public/private partnership is the high degree of government financial 
assistance. The simplest explanation for the assistance relates to the 
need to subsidize public goods or to compensate for positive externali- 
ties. Yet, if these goals were the exclusive motivation for government 
assistance, we would expect to see simple one-time subsidies being 
funnelled to project developers instead of the more complex financial 
risk-sharing contracts that are documented in this study. Why, given the 
loss of integration benefits entailed by such financing, do governments 
decide to intervene in the provision of infrastructure in this way? 
Perhaps the most important factor explaining the persistence of 
public financing relates to the risks of governmental contractual 
opportunism faced by private developers in the development and 
operation of physical infrastructure projects. In a first-best world, the 
risks embedded in the development contract might be divided between 
the government and the contractor in a manner that makes the private 
developer responsible for the endogenous production risks and the 
government responsible for risks of infringement through policy 
changes. Each party is the least-cost avoider of the risks that it has been 
assigned. Exogenous risks, that is, risks that neither party can control, 
should be transferred to the least-cost insurer, in this case, the govern- 
ment, owing to its superior risk-bearing capacity.'' Unfortunately, 
99 	The claim that government constitutes the lowestiost insurer, hence the best risk 
bearer, of exogenous risks is criticized by George Priest in the context. of losses 
caused by catastrophic events: see 'The Government, the Market, and the Problem 
of Catastrophic Loss' (paper presented at the Conference on Social Treatment of 
however, the first-best contractual allocation of risks is not realizable in 
this setting, given problems of contractual design. Put simply, a fully 
contingent contract outlining the limitations on governmental conduct 
cannot be specified owing to endemic foreseeability problems. But, 
even if such a contract could be devised, it is, of course, apparent that 
in the light of political and constitutional realities, government contrac- 
tual commitments in respect of risks over which it has direct control 
would be virtually impossible to specifically enforce. Its inherent 
legislative and regulatory jurisdiction makes the contract susceptible to 
unilateral ex post opportunism by a government which has changed, or 
which has changed its mind. The problems of unanticipated govern- 
ment action are, of course, pervasive in the modern regulatory state, 
but what makes these problems particularly acute in the case of physical 
infrastructure are the higher level of risks that reflect the sunk costs, 
anticipatory, and asset lumpiness properties of such investments. 
It is the combination of government inability to credibly commit to 
nonconfiscatory measures, combined with high probabilities (and 
accompanying costs) of such intervention, that makes the first-best 
contractual solution unattainable, and which remits parties to the 
second-best world. It is here that the sundry financial arrangements 
observed in the various public/private partnerships become more 
readily understandable. In the absence of nuanced contractual risk- 
allocation mechanisms, government risk-bearing through the supply of 
financial capital will attenuate the apprehensions of private developers 
over future governmental action. So doing will ensure that projects that 
might otherwise be negative net present value decisions will be under- 
taken by the developer. At the limit, government will supply all of the 
risk capital and the private developer will work on a cost-plus basis. But 
while this contract saves the developer harmless from the costs of future 
government action, it does so at too high a price; in terms of the 
optimal balance between incentives and insurance, the arrangements 
provide excessive insurance, increasing the likelihood of developer 
moral hazard, which impairs the productive efficiency gains that 
motivated the use of the bundled organizational form in the first place; 
hence, the value of more complex intermediate financial arrangements 
that do not dampen developer incentives for cost containment but do 
Catastrophic Risk, Stanford University, Lucas Conference Center, draft dated 21 
October 1994).Among other claims, Priest argues against government superiority in 
risk bearing on grounds of government's inability both to evaluate and to sort risks 
to ensure a pooling of independent (not variant) risks. 
provide some element of insurance. All of the projects surveyed in this 
study contain hybrid levels of financial risk sharing, whether achieved 
through well-specified subsidies or performance-based rental payments. 
In this respect, it should be noted that the financial structure 
dictated by optimal risk bearing may also coincide with some of the 
imperatives of the tournament-based selection process. The auction 
theory literature, for instance, distinguishes between private and 
common values auctions. Whereas in the former, the underlying values 
relied upon by bidders to frame a bid are solely a function of the 
bidder's own costs, in the latter case a bidder can improve his underly- 
ing valuation of the good subject to auction by learning his competi- 
tors' valuations. Given the role of exogenous factors - such as the level 
and direction of network externalities, trends in customer demand, and 
government policy changes - the multi-stage tournament for the 
franchise is most accurately characterized as possessing both common 
and private values properties. McAfee and McMillan argue that where 
common value elements are present in an auction, conditioning 
payment for the good on a royalty payment will generate more competi- 
tive bidding because the significance of inherent differences in bidder 
valuations is reduced.Im 
It is well known that contractual equilibria are conditioned on a 
number of external factors, one of the most important being the 
institutional framework for contractual enforcement. In Canada, the 
unfortunate events surrounding the abrogation of the Terminals 1and 
2 project, a related decision, amidst the public uproar over the Ter- 
minals 1 and 2 contract, to abandon a proposed private runway devel- 
opment project at Pearson International Airport after bids were re-
ceived but not opened, and the ex post modifications to the terms of 
the Highway 407 bidding process, have all contributed to legitimate 
concerns over government motivations, creating an environment which 
is becoming less congenial to these projects. To remedy this situation, 
supplemental institutions will have to be created which will support 
durable government commitments. 
In a thoughtful article on the relationship between institutions and 
government commitment making and keeping, Levy and Spiller have 
expressed caution with the degree to which institutional arrangements 
designed to support public commitment can be successfully transferred 
100 	R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan 'Auctions and Bidding' (1987) 25 J. of Econ. 
Lit. 699, 717-9. 
across co~ntries. '~'The claim is that if underlying social, political, 
, -
and constitutional factors - so-called institutional endowments - are not 
supportive of restrictions on governmental action, then the imposition 
of complex institutional arrangements designed to fetter arbitrary 
governmental action will be ineffectual. In this setting, other options, 
involving, inter alia, innovative transactional engineering, widespread 
public investments and monitoring by supra-national institutions are 
required. In the case of public/private infrastructure partnerships, the 
often sui generis nature of the projects, the difficulty of specifying clear 
outputs, the capacity of governments to confer broad gains on 
ratepayers by imposing price restrictions on investor operators, the 
need for project flexibility, all combine to subvert the capacity and cost- 
effectiveness of domestic regulatory or judicial remedies aimed at 
constraining governmental oppor t~nism. '~In this setting, greater 
reliance may need to be placed on supranational institutions, such as 
the GATT, regional trading blocks, or the World Bank. One possibility is 
for the bid protest and expropriation provisions currently set out in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement to be enlarged to include 
domestic as well as foreign firms. Alternatively, international public and 
private lending agencies could agree to condition the provision of 
investment on governmental adherence to independent arbitral 
decisions made in respect of alleged governmental takings. 
In any event, if the public/private partnership is to realize the 
expectations of its proponents, a more systematic and objective means 
of reconciling government's need for policy flexibility with the market's 
need for certainty must be devised. The ad hoc and politically moti- 
vated inquiry, such as that undertaken by Robert Nixon to evaluate the 
merits of the Pearson redevelopment project, will simply not suffice to 
allay market fears over capricious government action in respect of these 
investments. Nor, on the other hand, are conventional forms ofjudicial 
review of government actions likely to possess the institutional expertise 
to evaluate credibly the integrity of the decision-making process 
entailed in such large and complex projects.103 In the absence of such 
101 Levy and Spiller, supra note 74. 
102 And while ex ante certification procedures may assist in resolving these problems 
around the time of project construction, as soon as the project commences 
operation, several explicit or implicit modifications will be made to the formal 
contract which, in turn, will subvert the value of the earlier certification exercise 
and render the owner/operator susceptible to a charge that these changes are in 
bad faith and abusive. 
103 See Atwood and Trebilcock, supra note 90. 
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institutional innovations, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the 
current wave of enthusiasm for private sector development of public 
infrastructure in both developed and developing economies may turn 
out to be little more than a form of political 'cycling' that will replay 
the demise of the municipal franchise contract in Canada and the 
United States early in this century. Let us hope that we will not be con- 
demned to repeating the errors of history by neglecting that history. 
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